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ABSTRACT 
Outside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records, 
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other records 
containing individually identifiable health information in the course 
of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice, 
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review, 
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters. This 
Article is the first to argue that state rules of professional conduct, not 
federal health information confidentiality regulations, should govern 
outside health care counsel’s use and disclosure of confidential client 
information, and that outside counsel should be excepted from direct 
federal regulation under the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 
INTRODUCTION 
utside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records, 
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other 
records containing individually identifiable health information in the 
course of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice, 
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review, 
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters.1 This 
Article examines the legal duties of confidentiality that apply to 
outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a business 
	
1 See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Stone, Attorney Access to Medical Records, WIS. LAW., Oct. 
2003, at 24, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Wisconsin 
_Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=49216 (discussing outside 
health care counsel’s integral role in many aspects of their health care provider clients’ 
operational matters); Elizabeth C. Stone, Attorney Access To and Use of Medical Records, 
WIS. LAW., Aug. 2003, at 18, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfm 
?Section=Wisconsin_Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=34198 
(explaining that outside health care counsel frequently need access to their health care 
provider clients’ medical records). 
O
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associate (BA) under federal health information confidentiality 
regulations (Privacy Rule),2 giving special attention to the new duties 
imposed on BAs by the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act3 within the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA).4 
This Article argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule 
directly to outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a 
BA is unjustified, illogical, and unnecessary, and will exacerbate 
existing conflicts of interest.5 A proposed statutory amendment to 
HITECH would give the federal Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) the authority to except certain classes of BAs, 
including outside health care counsel, from direct regulation by the 
Privacy Rule as well as from the imposition of civil and criminal 
penalties.6 Further proposals would preserve and strengthen the 
ability of state bars to impose sanctions on licensed attorneys who fail 
to maintain the confidentiality of client communications and records.7 
Part I of this Article proceeds by reviewing the history of the 
Privacy Rule. Part II examines the obligations of confidentiality 
imposed by the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule: (1) directly on health 
plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers 
(covered entities); and (2) indirectly, by contract, on BAs, including 
many outside health care attorneys. Part III explores the new, direct 
duties of confidentiality that apply to BAs under HITECH as well as 
HHS’s final modifications to the Privacy Rule implementing 
HITECH. Part IV summarizes the duties of confidentiality that apply 
to outside health care counsel under state rules of professional 
conduct. 
Part V argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule 
directly to outside health care counsel who meet the definition of a 
BA is unjustified, illogical, and unnecessary, and will exacerbate 
existing conflicts of interest between health care attorneys and their 
clients. In particular, Part V.A. demonstrates that Congress had ample 
justification in 1996 for directing HHS to impose new confidentiality 
	
2 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2011). 
3 Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), 
Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–79 (2009). 
4 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009). 
5 See infra Parts V.A.–C. 
6 See infra Part VI. 
7 See id. 
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requirements on health care providers and health plans given the 
thousands of providers and plans that failed to maintain the 
confidentiality of millions of patients and insureds. On the other hand, 
Part V.A also presents research showing that only a handful of cases 
involve claims against outside counsel for their alleged failure to 
maintain the confidentiality of their clients’ individually identifiable 
health information, suggesting that the longstanding regulation of 
such attorneys by their state bars, as described in Part IV, may be 
more than sufficient. Part V.B. explores particular provisions within 
the Privacy Rule that HITECH extends directly to outside health care 
counsel, and demonstrates how the application of these provisions to 
outside health care counsel is illogical and unnecessary. Part V.B. 
also argues that, unlike state bars, HHS may not have the knowledge, 
skills, or experience necessary to regulate attorneys and other non-
health industry participants. Part V.C. illustrates how HITECH’s 
extension of the Privacy Rule to outside health care counsel will 
exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between outside health care 
counsel and their clients. 
Part VI proposes that Congress amend HITECH to give HHS the 
authority to except certain classes of BAs, including outside health 
care counsel, from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. Part VI 
offers language for the proposed statutory amendment and regulatory 
exception. Part VI also outlines methods for preserving and 
strengthening the ability of state bars to impose sanctions on licensed 
attorneys who fail to maintain the confidentiality of client 
information. This Article concludes with a recommendation that, 
going forward, Congress and HHS more carefully consider the 
application of health care-related regulations to non-health industry 
participants. 
I 
THE PRIVACY RULE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
As signed into law by President Clinton on August 21, 1996, the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) had 
several purposes, including improving portability and continuity of 
health insurance coverage in the individual and group markets, 
combating health care fraud and abuse, promoting the use of medical 
savings accounts, improving access to long-term care services and 
insurance coverage, and simplifying the administration of health 
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insurance.8 The administrative simplification provisions, codified at 
Subtitle F of Title II of HIPAA, directed HHS to issue regulations 
protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health information 
if Congress failed to enact comprehensive privacy legislation within 
three years of HIPAA’s enactment.9 When Congress failed to meet its 
deadline, HHS incurred the duty to adopt privacy regulations.10 
HIPAA clarified, however, that any privacy regulations adopted by 
HHS must be made applicable only to three classes of covered 
entities: (1) health plans, (2) health care clearinghouses, and (3) health 
care providers who transmit health information in electronic form in 
connection with certain standard transactions.11 
HHS responded. On November 3, 1999,12 and December 28, 
2000,13 HHS issued proposed and final rules, respectively, governing 
the confidentiality of protected health information (“PHI”). On March 
27, 2002,14 and August 14, 2002, 15 HHS issued proposed and final 
modifications to the Privacy Rule. With the exception of technical 
corrections and conforming amendments,16 the Privacy Rule 
remained largely unchanged between 2002 and 2009. 
	
8 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
9 See id. § 264(c)(1) (“If legislation governing standards with respect to the privacy of 
individually identifiable health information . . . is not enacted by the date that is 36 months 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Health and Human Services 
shall promulgate final regulations containing such standards . . . .”). 
10 See id. 
11 Id. § 262(a) (“Any standard adopted under this part shall apply, in whole or in part, 
to the following persons: ‘(1) A health plan. (2) A health care clearinghouse. (3) A health 
care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form in connection with a 
transaction referred to in section 1173(a)(1).’”); see also generally Standards for Privacy 
of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,924 (proposed 
Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160–64) [hereinafter Proposed HIPAA 
Privacy Rule] (explaining that HHS did not directly regulate any entity that was not a 
“covered entity” because it did not have the statutory authority to do so). 
12 Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,918. 
13 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160–64) [hereinafter Final HIPAA 
Privacy Rule]. 
14 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
14,776 (proposed modification Mar. 27, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
15 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 
53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
16 See, e.g., Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 66 
Fed. Reg. 12,434 (correction Feb. 26, 2001) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164); 
Technical Corrections to the Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health 
Information Published December 28, 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,944 (correction Dec. 29, 
2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
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The nature and scope of the legal duties of confidentiality that 
applied to BAs, including many health care attorneys, changed 
significantly over three years ago. On February 17, 2009, President 
Obama signed ARRA into law.17 Division A/Title XIII of ARRA, 
better known as HITECH, included certain privacy provisions that 
imposed new duties, and allowed for the imposition of civil and 
criminal penalties, directly on certain individuals who meet the 
definition of a BA under the Privacy Rule.18 
Since ARRA’s enactment, HHS has been busy issuing proposed, 
interim final, and final rules implementing HITECH’s privacy-related 
requirements. On August 24, 2009, HHS released an interim final rule 
implementing HITECH’s new breach notification requirements, 
including a breach notification requirement that applies directly to 
BAs.19 On October 30, 2009, HHS released an interim final rule 
implementing HITECH’s strengthened enforcement provisions, 
including strengthened civil monetary penalties that the federal Office 
for Civil Rights (OCR) may, for the first time since the enactment of 
the HIPAA statute, impose directly on BAs who fail to maintain the 
confidentiality of PHI.20 On July 14, 2010, HHS released a proposed 
rule that would modify the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Breach 
Notification, and Enforcement Rules in accordance with HITECH.21 
On May 31, 2011, HHS released a proposed rule that would modify 
the Privacy Rule’s accounting of disclosures requirement.22 On 
September 14, 2011, HHS released a proposed rule that would modify 
the Privacy Rule to provide individuals with the right to receive their 
laboratory test reports directly from the testing laboratories.23 Finally, 
	
17 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009). 
18 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 13001-13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–279 (2009). 
19 Breach Notification for Unsecured Protected Health Information, 74 Fed. Reg. 
42,740 (interim Aug. 24, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
20 HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Enforcement, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,123 (interim 
Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 160) [hereinafter Enforcement Interim Final 
Rule]. 
21 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, and Enforcement Rules Under the 
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
40,868 (proposed July 14, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
22 HIPAA Privacy Rule Accounting of Disclosures under the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 31,426 (proposed May 
31, 2011) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 164) [hereinafter Proposed Accounting of 
Disclosures Rule]. 
23 CLIA Program and HIPAA Privacy Rule; Patients’ Access to Test Reports, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 56,712 (proposed Sept. 14, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 493, 45 C.F.R. pt. 
164). 
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on January 25, 2013, HHS released a final rule modifying the HIPAA 
Privacy, Security, Breach Notification, and Enforcement Rules in 
accordance with HITECH (Final Modifications).24 The proposals in 
this Article are especially timely given HHS’s recent release of the 
Final Modifications. 
II 
PRE-HITECH DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. Direct Regulation of Covered Entities 
As required by HIPAA, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule directly 
regulated only the following covered entities: (1) health plans, (2) 
health care clearinghouses, and (3) health care providers who transmit 
health information in electronic form in connection with certain 
standard transactions.25 Although HHS indicated its desire to regulate 
all individuals and entities that receive or maintain individually 
identifiable health information, HHS also recognized that the 
rulemaking authority delegated to it by Congress in HIPAA was 
limited only to covered entities.26 
The Privacy Rule directly regulates covered entities’ uses of, 
disclosures of, and requests for individually identifiable health 
information to the extent such information does not constitute: (1) an 
education record protected under the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA); (2) a student treatment record 
excepted from protection under FERPA; or (3) an employment record 
held by a covered entity in its role as an employer.27 The name given 
by the Privacy Rule to the subset of individually identifiable health 
information described in the previous sentence is protected health 
information (PHI). 
	
24 Modifications to the HIPAA Privacy, Security, Enforcement, and Breach 
Notification Rules under the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical 
Health Act and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act; Other Modifications to 
the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5,566 (Jan. 25, 2013) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 
164) [hereinafter Final Modifications]. 
25 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011). 
26 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,567. 
27 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining protected health information). The Final Modifications 
add a fourth category of information that is excluded from the definition of protected 
health information; that is, individually identifiable health information regarding a person 
who has been deceased for more than 50 years. See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 
5,689 (amending the definition of PHI at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103). 
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The Privacy Rule requires covered entities to adhere to a number of 
requirements when using and disclosing PHI.28 For example, covered 
entities are allowed to freely use and disclose PHI for their “own 
treatment, payment, or health care operations.”29 Because “health care 
operations” is defined to include “legal services,” covered entities 
may disclose PHI, including medical records, billing records, and 
health insurance claims records, to outside health care counsel for 
purposes of obtaining legal advice, counsel, and representation.30 
Covered entities also may use and disclose PHI for twelve different 
public policy activities without the prior written authorization of the 
individual who is the subject of the information.31 These public policy 
activities include, but are not limited to, uses and disclosures required 
by law,32 uses and disclosures for public health activities,33 
disclosures for law enforcement activities,34 uses and disclosures for 
research,35 and disclosures for workers’ compensation activities.36 
In the event that a covered entity would like to use or disclose PHI 
for a purpose that is not treatment, payment, health care operations, 
one of the public policy exceptions, or otherwise permitted or 
required by the Privacy Rule, the covered entity must obtain the prior 
written authorization of the individual who is the subject of the 
information.37 The Privacy Rule specifies the form of the 
authorization, including certain required elements and statements that 
are designed to place the individual on notice of how the individual’s 
PHI will be used or disclosed.38 
In addition to the use and disclosure requirements, the Privacy Rule 
also establishes five different individual rights.39 These rights include 
the right of an individual to: (1) receive a notice of privacy 
	
28 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502–164.514 (establishing the use and disclosure requirements). 
29 Id. § 164.506(c)(1). 
30 See id. § 164.501; see also Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,596 
(stating that a covered entity “may disclose relevant information to its attorneys, who are 
business associates, for purposes of health care operations, which includes uses and 
disclosures” necessary to obtain legal services). 
31 45 C.F.R. § 164.512. 
32 Id. § 164.512(a). 
33 Id. § 164.512(b). 
34 Id. § 164.512(f). 
35 Id. § 164.512(i). 
36 Id. § 164.512(l). 
37 See id. § 164.508(a)(1). 
38 See id. § 164.508(c)(1), (2). 
39 See id. §§ 164.520–164.528. 
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practices,40 (2) request additional privacy protections,41 (3) access 
PHI,42 (4) request amendment of incorrect or incomplete PHI,43 and 
(5) receive an accounting of disclosures.44 
Finally, the Privacy Rule establishes ten administrative 
requirements.45 Pursuant to these administrative requirements, 
covered entities must: (1) designate a privacy officer and a contact 
person who are responsible for implementing the Privacy Rule and 
receiving and processing privacy-related complaints; (2) train their 
workforce members regarding the covered entity’s privacy policies 
and procedures and the requirements of the Privacy Rule; (3) establish 
appropriate physical, technical, and administrative safeguards to 
protect the confidentiality of PHI; (4) provide a process for patients to 
make privacy-related complaints to the covered entity and the 
Secretary of HHS; (5) have and apply appropriate sanctions to 
members of the covered entity’s workforce who violate the covered 
entity’s privacy policies and procedures and the Privacy Rule; (6) 
mitigate, to the extent practicable, any harmful effect that is known to 
the covered entity of a use or disclosure of PHI that violates the 
Privacy Rule; (7) not intimidate, threaten, coerce, discriminate, or 
otherwise retaliate against any individual who exercises any right 
available under the Privacy Rule; (8) not require patients to waive 
their rights under the Privacy Rule as a condition of receiving 
treatment; (9) implement policies and procedures designed to ensure 
compliance with the Privacy Rule; and (10) maintain such policies 
and procedures and other documentation required by the Privacy Rule 
for six years from the date when the documentation was created or the 
date when it last was in effect, whichever is later.46 
	
40 Id. § 164.520. 
41 Id. § 164.522. 
42 Id. § 164.524. 
43 Id. § 164.526. 
44 Id. § 164.528. HHS has proposed to give individuals an additional right; that is, the 
right to receive a written access report. Proposed Accounting of Disclosures Rule, supra 
note 22, at 31,448 (proposing new 45 C.F.R. § 164.528(b)(1), which would require 
covered entities to provide individuals with a written access report upon their request). 
45 45 C.F.R. § 164.530. 
46 Id. § 164.530(a)–(j). 
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B. Indirect Regulation of Business Associates 
Before HITECH, many individuals who did not meet the definition 
of a covered entity and who were not members of the workforce47 of 
a covered entity continued to require access to PHI in order to 
perform functions, activities, and services for or on behalf of their 
covered entity clients. Third-party billing companies, for example, 
routinely receive PHI from their health care provider clients in order 
to create and send claims for reimbursement to health insurers.48 
Outside accountants and actuaries also require access to billing and 
claims records to provide accounting and actuarial services to their 
health care provider and health plan clients.49 Pharmacy benefit 
managers similarly require access to claims records to provide 
pharmacy benefit management services to their health plan clients.50 
Before HITECH, these third-party billing companies, outside 
accountants and actuaries, pharmacy benefit managers, and other 
contractors fell within the definition of a BA and were not directly 
regulated by the Privacy Rule. 
Attorneys who provide legal services to covered entities other than 
in the capacity of a workforce member of a covered entity also may 
require access to a covered entity’s PHI in order to provide the 
requested legal services.51 For example, an attorney who represents a 
physician in a medical malpractice claim will require a copy of the 
plaintiff’s medical record to prove to a court that the care provided by 
	
47 Workforce means “employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons whose 
conduct, in the performance of work for a covered entity, is under the direct control of 
such entity, whether or not they are paid by the covered entity.” Id. § 160.103. The Final 
Modifications expand the definition of workforce to include the workforce members of a 
business associate: “Workforce means employees, volunteers, trainees, and other persons 
whose conduct, in the performance of work for a covered entity or business associate, is 
under the direct control of such covered entity or business associate, whether or not they 
are paid by the covered entity or business associate.”  Final Modifications, supra note 24, 
at 5,689 (amending the definition of workforce at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103). 
48 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,475, 82,476 (noting that billing 
firms require access to PHI of covered entity clients and therefore fall within the definition 
of a BA). 
49 See id. at 82,545 (noting that accountants require access to PHI to provide accounting 
services to their covered-entity clients). 
50 See id. at 82,466 (noting that covered entities frequently share PHI with pharmacy 
benefit managers to obtain their services). 
51 See id. at 82,596 (noting that attorneys need to use and disclose PHI in the course of 
representing their covered entity clients); see also JOHN R. CHRISTIANSEN, PREEYA M. 
NORONHA & BRAD M. ROSTOLSKY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES IN A HITECH WORLD 13 
(2011) (listing a number of situations in which outside counsel will fall within the 
definition of a BA). 
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the physician adheres to the standard of care. Similarly, an attorney 
who represents a hospital in an Emergency Medical Treatment and 
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)52 claim will require copies of 
emergency room records documenting the medical screening 
examination and any necessary stabilizing treatment provided to the 
presenting patient in order to defend the hospital in a claim by the 
patient or the federal government.53 Likewise, an attorney who 
represents a health care provider, health care supplier, or other 
individual or institution in a fraud and abuse action54 may require 
access to medical records, billing records, and other records showing 
professional services rendered and insurance claims relating thereto. 
Moreover, an attorney who represents a physician or allied health 
professional in a hospital or other peer review matter55 may require 
access to medical records containing entries authored by the health 
care provider. In all of these examples, an attorney who is not a 
workforce member of a covered entity requires access to PHI of the 
covered entity in order to properly advise, counsel, represent, or 
defend the covered entity and thus falls within the definition of a 
BA.56 As discussed above and immediately below, the pre-HITECH 
Privacy Rule did not directly regulate the attorney’s use or disclosure 
of the PHI. As discussed in more detail in Part III, HITECH now 
allows for the direct regulation of the attorney’s use and disclosure of 
PHI by the federal government. 
Before HITECH, the Privacy Rule did condition the disclosure of 
PHI by a covered entity to a BA on the covered entity’s having a 
written agreement with the BA pursuant to which the BA agreed to 
maintain the confidentiality of the PHI received by the BA.57 More 
	
52 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
53 Id. § 1395dd(a) (establishing a medical screening examination requirement); id. § 
1395dd(b)(1) (establishing a necessary stabilizing treatment requirement). 
54 Federal health care fraud and abuse authorities include the Anti-Kickback Statute, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(b), the Physician Self-Referral Law (also known as the 
Stark Law), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn, and the False Claims Act, codified at 31 
U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
55 The federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act (HCQIA) establishes procedures 
to be followed by hospitals when removing physicians from their medical staffs in order to 
qualify for immunity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11111–11112. If a hospital fails to follow such 
procedures, the immunity provision may not apply and the physician may have a claim 
against the hospital under tort law, contract law, antitrust law, and other legal authorities. 
Id. § 11111. 
56 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103(1) (2011). 
57 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,504 (“We do not attempt to directly 
regulate business associates, but pursuant to our authority to regulate covered entities we 
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specifically, the Privacy Rule permitted a covered entity to disclose 
PHI to a BA only if the covered entity obtained satisfactory 
assurances from the BA that the BA would appropriately safeguard 
the PHI.58 The pre-HITECH Privacy Rule required the covered entity 
to document the satisfactory assurances in a business associate 
agreement (BAA) that meets certain requirements.59 The concepts of 
the BA and the BAA were considered a “work-around” of HHS’s 
jurisdictional limitations under the HIPAA statute.60 
The Privacy Rule required BAAs to contain several provisions.61 
First, unless both the covered entity and the BA are governmental 
entities, the BAA must establish the permitted and required uses and 
disclosures of such information by the BA.62 Although HITECH 
slightly changed these requirements,63 before HITECH, the BAA also 
must have provided that the BA would adhere to nine requirements, 
including: (1) not using or further disclosing the information other 
than as permitted or required by the BAA or as required by law; (2) 
using appropriate safeguards to prevent use or disclosure of the 
information other than as provided for by the BAA; (3) reporting to 
the covered entity any use or disclosure of the information not 
provided for by the BAA of which the BA becomes aware; (4) 
ensuring that any agents, including a subcontractor, to whom it 
provides PHI received from, or created or received by the BA on 
behalf of, the covered entity agree to the same restrictions and 
conditions that apply to the BA with respect to such information;64 (5) 
making available PHI in accordance with a Privacy Rule provision 
giving patients a right to access their PHI; (6) making available PHI 
for amendment and incorporating any amendments to PHI in 
accordance with a Privacy Rule provision giving patients the right to 
request amendment of incorrect or incomplete PHI; (7) making 
available information required to provide an accounting of disclosures 
	
place restrictions on the flow of information from covered entities to non-covered 
entities.”). 
58 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1)(i). 
59 Id. § 164.502(e)(2). 
60 See CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 1. 
61 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(2). 
62 Id. § 164.504(e)(2)(i). 
63 See infra Part III.D. 
64 The pre-HITECH requirement for a BA to ensure that any agents, including 
subcontractors, adhered to the same confidentiality restrictions and conditions that applied 
to the BA was (at least in practice) interpreted as a much looser standard than the 
regulatory requirement for BAAs. See CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 3. 
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in accordance with a Privacy Rule provision governing accountings of 
disclosures; (8) making its internal practices, books, and records 
relating to the use and disclosure of PHI received from, or created or 
received by the BA on behalf of, the covered entity available to the 
Secretary of HHS for purposes of determining the covered entity’s 
compliance with the Privacy Rule; and (9) at termination of the 
contract, if feasible, returning or destroying all PHI received from, or 
created or received by the BA on behalf of, the covered entity that the 
BA still maintains in any form and retaining no copies of such 
information or, if such return or destruction is not feasible, extending 
the protections of the contract to the information and limiting further 
uses and disclosures to those purposes that make the return or 
destruction of the information infeasible.65 Finally, the BAA must 
authorize termination of the BAA by the covered entity if the covered 
entity determines that the BA has violated a material term of the 
agreement.66 
In summary, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule did not directly 
regulate BAs, including many outside health care attorneys.67 
However, the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule indirectly regulated BAs by 
requiring covered entities to contractually obligate BAs to maintain 
the confidentiality of any PHI received by the BA.68 
Before HITECH, a covered entity was considered not in 
compliance with the Privacy Rule if the covered entity knew of a 
pattern of activity or practice of the BA that constituted a material 
breach or violation of the BAA unless the covered entity took 
reasonable steps to cure the breach or end the violation.69 If those 
steps were unsuccessful, the covered entity was required to “(A) 
[t]erminate the contract or arrangement, if feasible; or (B) [i]f 
termination [was] not feasible, report[] the problem to the Secretary 
[of HHS].”70 A BA, including a covered entity’s outside health care 
attorney, thus risked termination of both the BAA and the underlying 
representation agreement (and thus the privilege and benefits of 
representing the covered entity client) if the BA failed to maintain the 
	
65 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(11)(A)–(I). 
66 Id. § 164.504(e)(2)(111). 
67 See supra Part II.A. 
68 See supra text accompanying note 65; see also CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, 
at 3 (“While BAs could not be reached by HIPAA directly, they were reached indirectly 
by regulations which extended protections indirectly by requiring CEs to have a specific 
form of contract . . . in place before allowing their BA access to their PHI.”). 
69 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(1)(11). 
70 Id. 
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confidentiality of PHI received from the client. Before HITECH, 
however, a BA who failed to maintain the confidentiality of PHI did 
not risk the imposition of civil or criminal penalties by the federal 
government. 
III 
POST-HITECH DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY 
A. HITECH Overview 
The nature and scope of the legal duties of BAs changed 
substantially on February 17, 2009, when President Obama signed 
ARRA, which includes HITECH, into law.71 In terms of the duties of 
BAs, one of the most important provisions within HITECH is section 
13404(a), which provides in relevant part: “The additional 
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made 
applicable with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to 
such a business associate and shall be incorporated into the business 
associate agreement between the business associate and the covered 
entity.”72 That is, certain provisions within the Privacy Rule now 
directly apply to BAs. Section 13404(a) is supported by HITECH 
section 13404(c), a second important provision within HITECH, 
which provides that the civil and criminal penalties set forth in the 
HIPAA statute (codified at Sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social 
Security Act) that heretofore only applied to covered entities now 
may be imposed directly on BAs who fail to maintain the 
confidentiality of their covered entity clients’ PHI.73 A third 
important HITECH provision is section 13402, which requires both 
covered entities and BAs, following the discovery of a breach of 
unsecured PHI (“uPHI”), to notify certain individuals and 
organizations of such breach.74 HHS’s  implementation of these 
important HITECH sections is discussed in more detail below. 
	
71 ARRA, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009); HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, §§ 
13001–13424, 123 Stat. 115, 226–279 (2009). 
72 HITECH § 13404(a). 
73 Id. § 13404(c) (“In the case of a business associate that violates any provision of 
subsection (a) or (b), the provisions of sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1320d-5, 1320d-6 [sic]) shall apply to the business associate with respect to 
such violation in the same manner as such provisions apply to a person who violates a 
provision of part C of title XI of such Act.”). 
74 See id. § 13402. 
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B. Direct Regulation of Business Associates 
Following the enactment of HITECH, many health care attorneys 
questioned how HHS would implement HITECH section 13404(a)’s 
requirement that privacy-related provisions be made applicable to 
BAs.75 On January 25, 2013, HHS issued its Final Modifications, 
which show how broadly HHS interprets HITECH section 
13404(a).76 
More specifically, the preamble to the Final Modifications explains 
that HITECH section 13404(a): (1) creates direct liability for BAs 
when they use or disclose PHI other than in accordance with their 
BAAs, and (2) applies the other privacy requirements of HITECH to 
BAs just as they apply to covered entities.77 To implement these 
HITECH changes, the Final Modifications significantly change the 
opening provisions of the Privacy Rule set forth at 45 C.F.R. sections 
164.500, 164.502, and 164.504.78 
In particular, the Final Modifications revise the first substantive 
regulation within the Privacy Rule to provide that the standards, 
requirements, and implementation specifications set forth in the 
Privacy Rule apply to a BA with respect to the PHI of a covered 
entity.79 As discussed in more detail in Part V.B., this provision is 
somewhat illogical because most of the standards in the Privacy Rule 
only make sense when applied to health plans and health care 
providers, not non-health industry actors, including individual 
attorneys or law firms.80 Stated another way, attorneys simply do not 
engage in treatment, health insurance reimbursement, health care 
utilization review, medical necessity reviews, determinations of 
health insurance eligibility or coverage, adjudication or subrogation 
of health benefit claims, risk adjustments based on a current or 
prospective insured’s health status and demographic characteristics, 
training of health care professionals, health care quality assessment 
and improvement, development of clinical guidelines, health care 
	
75 See id. § 13404(a). 
76 Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,597. 
77 Id. at 5,597; see also Jennifer A. Stiller, Lawyers Beware: Take Action Now to 
Protect Healthcare Information or Risk Stiff Penalties, LAW OFFICES OF JENNIFER A. 
STILLER (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.healthregs.com/HITECH-HIPAA-BusinessAssociate 
Rules.shtml (explaining that HITECH requires attorneys who represent physicians, 
hospitals, health insurance companies, and other Covered Entities to directly comply with 
the Privacy Rule). 
78 Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695–97. 
79 Id. at 5,695 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(c)). 
80 See infra Part V.B. 
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protocol development, case management and care coordination, 
health care professional peer review, medical training of health care 
professionals, health insurance underwriting, health insurance 
premium rating, public health activities, biomedical and behavioral 
research, and most other activities that are regulated by the standards, 
requirements, and implementation specifications set forth in the 
Privacy Rule. 
In addition, the Final Modifications revise the Privacy Rule’s 
second substantive regulation to generally provide that a BA, like a 
covered entity, may not use or disclose PHI except as permitted or 
required by the Privacy Rule or the HIPAA Enforcement Rule.81 For 
example, if an outside health care attorney who meets the definition 
of a BA sells a patient’s PHI without obtaining the prior written 
authorization of the patient who is the subject of the PHI, the attorney 
would be violating the Privacy Rule. By further example, if an outside 
health care attorney who meets the definition of a BA inappropriately 
uses, discloses, or requests more than the minimum amount of PHI 
that is necessary to provide legal services to the covered entity, the 
attorney also would be violating the Privacy Rule. As discussed in 
more detail in Part V.A., this provision is also somewhat unnecessary 
because, unlike the tens of thousands of documented cases of 
confidentiality breaches by health plans and health care providers, 
research revealed only a handful of cases in which outside counsel 
breached the confidentiality of their covered entities’ PHI. In 
addition, state rules of professional conduct already prohibit attorneys 
from using and disclosing client records for inappropriate purposes. 
The Final Modifications also add new sub-provisions within the 
second substantive regulation to specifically address the permitted 
and required uses and disclosures of PHI by BAs.82 For example, one 
provision allows BAs to use or disclose PHI only as permitted or 
required by their BAAs or as required by law.83 Thus, if an outside 
health care attorney who constitutes a BA uses or discloses PHI for a 
purpose other than the purposes (e.g., legal and other professional 
services) specified in the BAA, the attorney would be violating the 
Privacy Rule. 
A second provision clarifies that a BA is not permitted to use or 
disclose PHI in a manner that would violate the requirements of the 
	
81 Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)). 
82 Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(4)). 
83 Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)). 
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Privacy Rule if done by a covered entity.84 Thus, if it would be a 
violation of the Privacy Rule for a covered hospital to sell a patient’s 
PHI without the patient’s authorization, it would also be a violation of 
the Privacy Rule for the covered hospital’s outside health care counsel 
to sell a hospital patient’s PHI without the patient’s authorization. 
A third provision obligates BAs to disclose PHI in certain 
situations. For example, the Final Modifications obligate BAs to 
disclose PHI to the covered entity, the patient or insured who is the 
subject of the PHI, and/or the patient’s designee, as necessary to 
satisfy the covered entity’s obligations relating to the individual’s 
right to inspect and obtain a copy of his or her PHI.85 Thus, if a 
patient requests a covered hospital to give the patient access to her 
PHI and the covered hospital’s outside health care attorney, for some 
reason, has PHI that the covered hospital does not (a highly unlikely 
hypothetical), the attorney would be required under the Final 
Modifications to provide PHI to the covered hospital or the individual 
to facilitate the individual’s right of access to her PHI. 
A fourth provision modifies the minimum necessary standard to 
require that when BAs use, disclose, or request PHI, they must limit 
the PHI to the minimum amount of information necessary to 
accomplish the intended purpose of the use, disclosure, or request.86 
Stated another way, a BA is not making a permitted use or disclosure 
under the Privacy Rule if the BA does not apply the minimum 
necessary standard, where appropriate.87 An outside health care 
attorney who constitutes a BA should be mindful of the Final 
Modifications when requesting copies of medical records, billing 
records, claims information, or other information that the attorney 
needs in order to provide legal services to a covered entity client. If 
the attorney needs only a discrete class of information in order to 
provide the requested legal services, the attorney has a regulatory 
obligation to limit her request to that discrete class of information. On 
the other hand, many civil and criminal defense attorneys need access 
to entire record sets in order to identify facts that could support the 
application of a particular legal defense, such as contributory 
negligence, comparative negligence, or assumption of the risk, in the 
medical malpractice context. If a defense attorney requires an entire 
	
84 Id. (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)). 
85 Id. (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(4)(ii)). 
86 Id. at 5,697 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1)). 
87 See id. at 5,597. 
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record or record set to properly represent or defend a covered entity, 
the attorney may continue to request the entire record or record set. 
HHS amended the minimum necessary provisions to specifically 
reference the obligation of a BA to only use, disclose, or request the 
minimum amount of information necessary to accomplish the 
intended purpose. However, HHS did not add references to BAs to 
other provisions of the Privacy Rule that now apply to BAs. In the 
preamble to the Final Modifications, HHS reasons that because the 
Final Modifications prohibit a BA from using or disclosing PHI in 
any manner that would violate the Privacy Rule if done by a covered 
entity, additional references to BAs in the Privacy Rule’s use and 
disclosure requirements are unnecessary: “[A]ny Privacy Rule 
limitation on how a covered entity may use or disclose [PHI] 
automatically extends to [BAs].”88 
C. Civil Penalties, Criminal Penalties, and Audits 
HITECH provides that the civil and criminal penalties set forth in 
the HIPAA statute and codified at sections 1176 and 1177 of the 
Social Security Act now apply to BAs who violate any provision of 
HITECH sections 13404(a) and 13404(b).89 On October 30, 2009, 
HHS released an interim final rule implementing strengthened 
enforcement provisions for the Privacy Rule, including strengthened 
civil monetary penalties.90 In addition, HHS released the Final 
Modifications implementing HITECH’s directed changes to the 
Enforcement Rule on January 25, 2013. The Final Modifications 
clarify (by adding the phrase “business associate” to many provisions 
within the Administrative Simplification regulations) that the 
Secretary of HHS may impose civil money penalties not only on 
Covered Entities but also on BAs who violate the Privacy Rule.91 
This means that the Secretary may impose civil money penalties on 
outside health care attorneys who meet the definition of a BA and 
violate the Privacy Rule.92 
	
88 Id. 
89 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(c), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009). 
90 Enforcement Interim Final Rule, supra note 20, at 56,123. 
91 See, e.g., Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,691 (amending 45 C.F.R. § 
160.402(a) to provide that “the Secretary will impose a civil money penalty upon a 
covered entity or business associate if the Secretary determines that the covered entity or 
business associate has violated an administrative simplification provision” (emphasis 
added)). 
92 For violations of the Privacy Rule occurring on or after February 18, 2009, the 
Secretary may impose civil money penalties of $100 to $50,000 (if the BA did not know, 
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Outside health care attorneys who meet the definition of a BA also 
may be subject to criminal penalties. Criminal penalties remain at 
their pre-HITECH levels, including: (1) criminal fines of not more 
than $50,000, imprisonment of not more than one year, or both; (2) 
for offenses committed under false pretenses, criminal fines of not 
more than $100,000, imprisonment of not more than five years, or 
both; and (3) for offenses committed “with intent to sell, transfer, or 
use individually identifiable health information for commercial 
advantage, personal gain, or malicious harm,” criminal fines of not 
more than $250,000, imprisonment of not more than ten years, or 
both.93 
Finally, HITECH section 13411 provides that BAs shall be subject 
to periodic audits by the Secretary of HHS as one way of ensuring 
that BAs are complying with their new privacy-related 
requirements.94 
IV 
DUTIES OF CONFIDENTIALITY UNDER STATES RULES OF 
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 
The previous Parts examined the indirect and direct confidentiality 
requirements imposed by the original Privacy Rule and HITECH, 
respectively, on health care attorneys who meet the definition of a 
BA. This Part examines the legal duties of confidentiality imposed on 
all licensed attorneys, including licensed outside health care counsel, 
by state rules of professional conduct. Under the American Bar 
Association’s (ABA’s) Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model 
Rules) and state rules of professional conduct, all licensed attorneys 
have an ethical duty to maintain the confidentiality of client 
information acquired during the course of, or by reason of 
representation of, a client.95 The rule of confidentiality applies not 
	
and by exercising reasonable diligence would not have known, of the violation); of $1,000 
to $50,000 (if the violation was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect); of 
$10,000 to $50,000 (if the violation was due to willful neglect and was corrected during 
the first 30 days); and of $50,000 (if the violation was due to willful neglect and was not 
corrected during the first 30 days). See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,583 
(charting the different penalty levels). However, civil money penalties may not exceed 
$1.5 million for identical violations in a calendar year regardless of the BA’s level of 
culpability. Id. 
93 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6 (2012). 
94 HITECH § 13411. 
95 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2011); TEX. DISCIPLINARY 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 amendments). 
TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  8:39 AM 
832 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 813 
only to matters communicated to the attorney in confidence by the 
client, but also to all information relating to the representation, 
whatever its source.96 Medical records, billing records, and other 
information and data obtained by a health care attorney while 
representing a patient or health industry client constitutes 
“confidential information” for purposes of rules of the professional 
responsibility.97 
Except as otherwise permitted, most state rules prohibit an attorney 
from knowingly revealing confidential information of a client or 
former client to: (1) a person that the client has instructed is not to 
receive the information; or (2) any other person, other than the client, 
the client’s representatives, or the members, associates, or employees 
of the attorney’s law firm.98 These rules would prohibit, for example, 
a health care attorney from disclosing the contents of medical or 
billing records obtained during the course of representation to the 
attorney’s spouse, partner, or friends, or to other third parties for 
purposes unrelated to the legal advice and counsel for which the 
attorney was retained. 
Most state rules of professional conduct also prohibit an attorney 
from: (1) using confidential information of a client to the 
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation; 
(2) using confidential information of a former client to the 
disadvantage of the former client after the representation is concluded 
unless the former client consents after consultation or the confidential 
information has become generally known; or (3) using privileged 
information of a client for the advantage of the attorney or of a third 
person, unless the client consents after consultation.99 These rules 
would, of course, prohibit a health care attorney from selling medical 
record or other patient or insured data to a newspaper or tabloid for 
	
96 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 361 
(Wis. 2001). 
97 See, e.g., id. (adjudicating a disciplinary action taken by then-named Wisconsin 
Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) against a Wisconsin-licensed 
attorney for his failure to maintain the confidentiality of his client’s medical records; the 
Board suspended the attorney’s license to practice law for six months after finding, among 
other things, that the client “did not authorize [the attorney] to release her medical records 
to anyone. [The attorney’s] disclosure of information that he obtained while representing 
[the client] violated client-lawyer confidentiality”; the Wisconsin Supreme Court further 
explained that “the rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client, . . . but also to all information relating to the 
representation whatever its source.’”). 
98 See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(b)(1). 
99 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(b)(2)–(4). 
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the financial advantage of the attorney or to the disadvantage of the 
attorney’s health industry client. 
Most state rules of professional conduct permit an attorney to 
reveal unprivileged client information in certain situations, including: 
(1) when impliedly authorized to do so in order to carry out the 
representation; and (2) when the attorney has reason to believe it is 
necessary to do so in order to: (i) carry out the representation 
effectively; (ii) defend the attorney or the attorney’s employees or 
associates against a claim of wrongful conduct; (iii) respond to 
allegations in any proceeding concerning the attorney’s representation 
of the client; or (iv) prove the services rendered to a client, or the 
reasonable value thereof, or both, in an action against another person 
or organization responsible for the payment of the fee for services 
rendered to the client.100 These rules would thus permit an attorney 
who specializes in medical malpractice to use medical record data in 
petitions, answers, counterclaims, motions and other pleadings as 
necessary to bring or defend a health care liability claim. 
Most state rules of professional conduct also permit an attorney to 
reveal confidential information acquired during the course of or 
reason of representation of a client: (1) when the attorney has been 
expressly authorized to do so in order to carry out the representation; 
(2) when the client consents after consultation; (3) to the client, the 
client’s representatives, or the members, associates, and employees of 
the attorney’s firm, except when otherwise instructed by the client; 
(4) when the attorney has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in 
order to comply with a court order, a state rule of professional 
conduct, or other law; (5) to the extent reasonably necessary to 
enforce a claim or establish a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a 
controversy between the lawyer and the client; (6) to establish a 
defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint 
against the attorney or the attorney’s associates based upon conduct 
involving the client or the representation of the client; (7) when the 
attorney has reason to believe it is necessary to do so in order to 
prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act; and 
(8) to the extent revelation reasonably appears necessary to rectify the 
consequences of a client’s criminal or fraudulent act in the 
commission of which the attorney’s services had been used.101 Health 
care attorneys routinely rely on some of these exceptions to 
	
100 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(d)(1)–(2). 
101 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05(c)(1)–(8). 
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confidentiality. For example, the third clause in the previous sentence 
permits a senior partner or shareholder who is representing a health 
industry client to share medical records, billing records, and other 
individually identifiable health information with a junior associate, 
paralegal, or other law firm employee who is needed by the senior 
partner to assist in the representation of the client. 
An attorney’s state law duty of confidentiality to a client is 
grounded in the fiduciary duty owed by the attorney to the client as 
well as the need for the legal system to function properly.102  Without 
an assurance of confidentiality, a health industry client may fail to 
seek early legal assistance or fully disclose the facts of the matter to 
her attorney.103 An attorney’s duty of confidentiality is given effect 
not only in state rules of professional conduct but also in the law of 
evidence regarding the attorney-client privilege as well as through the 
law of agency.104 The attorney-client privilege, for example, provides 
patients and health industry clients the right to prevent certain 
confidential communications from being revealed by compulsion of 
law.105 
In summary, the provisions governing confidentiality in most state 
rules of professional conduct are comprehensive and detailed. The 
provisions explain exactly when an attorney can and cannot use and 
disclose confidential client information, and carefully balance a 
client’s need for confidentiality with the attorney’s need to use and 
disclose information to carry out the representation. Unlike the 
Privacy Rule, there are no provisions governing confidentiality in the 
state rules that are nonsensical when applied to attorneys. All of the 
permissions and prohibitions set forth in the state rules govern 
activities that come up on a daily basis in an attorney’s practice. 
These state rules, drafted by attorneys for attorneys, should govern an 
attorney’s use and disclosure of confidential client information. 
V 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST HITECH’S EXTENSION OF THE PRIVACY RULE 
TO OUTSIDE HEALTH CARE COUNSEL 
This Part argues that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule’s 
confidentiality requirements directly to outside health care counsel 
	
102 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05 cmt. 1. 
103 See, e.g., id. 
104 See, e.g., id. R. 1.05 cmt. 3. 
105 See, e.g., id. 
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who meet the definition of a BA is unjustified, illogical, and 
unnecessary, and will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between 
health care attorneys and their health industry clients. 
A. HITECH’s Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care 
Counsel Is Unjustified 
Congress’s initial decision in 1996 to directly regulate health plans, 
health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers was well 
justified. First, remember that Congress’s purpose in enacting 
HIPAA’s Administrative Simplification provisions was to improve 
the Medicare and Medicaid programs (two covered health plans), as 
well as the efficiency and effectiveness of the health care system more 
generally by encouraging the development of a health information 
system through the establishment of standards and requirements for 
the electronic transmission of certain health information.106 Congress 
also recognized, however, that the increased accessibility of health 
information made possible by the widespread and growing use of 
electronic media by health plans and health care providers, as well as 
the new federal mandate for standard transactions and code set use by 
health plans and health care providers, would require enhanced 
confidentiality requirements.107 No such federal mandate for standard 
transaction and code set use108 was applied to BAs, including outside 
health care counsel. Without a requirement to electronically transmit 
health information, there was no resulting increase in the risk of a 
confidentiality breach by such BAs, including outside health care 
counsel. 
	
106 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2 (2012). At the time of HIPAA’s enactment, approximately 400 
different health insurance claim formats were in use in the United States. The submission 
of electronic health care claims was limited, then, because most health care providers 
could support only a handful of formats. In order to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the health care system, Congress directed HHS to create uniform 
standards for health insurance-related transactions as well as uniform codes (called 
‘standard transactions and code sets’) to be used in those transactions. See William P. 
Matthews, Caught Up In the Expanding Net: Regulation of the Business Associate Under 
the HIPAA Privacy Regulations, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Apr. 2003, at 32, 33 (explaining the 
need for standard transactions and code sets). 
107 Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,928; see also Alex L. Bednar, 
HIPAA Implications for Attorney-Client Privilege, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 871, 880 (2004) 
(discussing the legislative history of HIPAA, including the belief of some legislators that 
electronic technology innovation would increase privacy and security concerns). 
108 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (explaining standard transactions and 
code sets). 
TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  8:39 AM 
836 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 813 
Like Congress, HHS also recognized that the growing use of 
computerization in the health care industry, including the rapid 
growth of electronic transfers of health information between and 
among health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care 
providers, gave rise to significant confidentiality concerns:109 
[M]ore and more health care providers, plans, and others are 
utilizing electronic means of storing and transmitting health 
information. In 1996, the health care industry invested an estimated 
$10 billion to $15 billion on information technology . . . . The 
electronic information revolution is transforming the recording of 
health information so that the disclosure of information may require 
only a push of a button.110 
HHS further explained that the number of health care industry 
participants that maintain and transmit individually identifiable health 
information has increased over the last decade: “The health care 
industry has been transformed from one that relied primarily on one-
on-one interactions between patients and clinicians to a system of 
integrated health care delivery networks and managed care 
providers.”111 
HHS’s concerns were supported by relevant findings of the 
American Health Information Management Association (AHIMA).112 
According to AHIMA, approximately 150 health care providers and 
ancillary hospital service providers—including physicians, nurses, x-
ray technicians, and billing clerks—”have access to a patient’s 
medical records during the course of a typical hospitalization.”113 
According to other research organizations, such as the National 
Research Council, health care providers and plans frequently shared 
individually identifiable health information with consulting 
physicians, managed care organizations, health insurance companies, 
life insurance companies, self-insured employers, pharmacies, 
pharmacy benefit managers, clinical laboratories, accrediting 
organizations, state and federal statistical agencies, and medical 
information bureaus.114 Although some of these individuals and 
organizations had a legitimate need to access, use, and disclose 
medical, billing, and claims records, over-sharing such information 
	
109 Proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 11, at 59,928. 
110 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,465. 
111 Id. at 82,466. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
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increased the risk that patients’ confidential information would be 
leaked to outside sources. However, at that time, there were no federal 
statutes or regulations governing which classes of individuals could 
access, use, and disclose these records, what information in the 
records should and could be accessed, used, and disclosed, and the 
use and disclosure restrictions that should attach to such information. 
Concerns about the lack of attention to health information 
confidentiality by health care providers, health plans, and other health 
care industry participants were not just theoretical.115 In 1993, 
Johnson & Johnson, the New Jersey-based multi-national 
manufacturer of pharmaceutical, diagnostic, therapeutic, surgical, and 
biotechnology products, marketed a list of five million names and 
addresses of elderly incontinent women without their permission.116 
In 1996, an employee of the Tampa, Florida, health department 
removed from her work a computer disk containing the names of 
4,000 people who had tested positive for HIV.117 In 1999, a 
Michigan-based health system accidentally posted the medical 
records of thousands of patients on the Internet.118 In 2000, a Utah-
based pharmaceutical benefit management firm used patient data to 
solicit business for its owner, a drug store.119 The same year, a patient 
in a Boston-area hospital discovered that her medical records had 
been read by more than 200 of the hospital’s employees.120 
Even after the April 14, 2003, general compliance date for the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule,121 health care providers and health plans 
continued to inappropriately use and disclose PHI. For example, 
between 2005 and 2008, numerous members of the workforce of 
covered health care provider UCLA Health System repeatedly and 
without permission examined the electronic PHI of UCLA patients.122 
By further example, between 2005 and 2009, covered health care 
provider Phoenix Cardiac Surgery failed to have in place appropriate 
and reasonable administrative and technical safeguards to protect the 
	
115 Id. at 82,467. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 45 C.F.R. § 164.534 (2011). 
122 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan 08-82727 and 08-83510 
between the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and 
the Regents of the University of California, 1–2 (July 6, 2011), available at 
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/uclahsracap.pdf. 
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confidentiality of PHI, which contributed to the posting of over 1,000 
separate entries of ePHI on a publicly accessible, Internet-based 
calendar and the daily transmission of ePHI from an Internet-based 
email account to workforce members’ personal Internet-based email 
accounts.123 
On several occasions in 2006, Rite Aid pharmacies located in cities 
across the United States disposed of paper PHI in open dumpsters 
potentially accessible to persons who were not members of Rite Aid’s 
workforce.124 Television media actually videotaped Rite Aid 
pharmacy workforce members disposing of prescriptions and labeled 
pill bottles containing patient identifiable information in industrial 
trash containers that were accessible to the general public.125 
Similarly, and on several occasions in 2006 and 2007, CVS 
pharmacies located in cities across the United States also disposed of 
paper PHI in open dumpsters potentially accessible to persons who 
were not members of CVS’s workforce.126 Media outlets also caught 
the CVS disposals on videotape.127 
Some of the covered health plans and health care providers who 
were inappropriately using and disclosing PHI were doing so for 
marketing purposes. Between 2007 and 2010, for example, covered 
entity Management Services Organization Washington, Inc. (MSO) 
impermissibly disclosed PHI to Washington Practice Management 
	
123 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Phoenix Cardiac 
Surgery, P.C., 2 (Apr. 13, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa 
/enforcement/examples/pcsurgery_agreement.pdf. 
124 See Written Resolution Agreement and Collective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Rite Aid 
Corporation, 1 (June 7, 2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa 
/enforcement/examples/riteaidres.pdf. 
125 See Rite Aid Agrees to Pay $1 Million to Settle HIPAA Privacy Case, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples 
/riteaidresagr.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
126 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and CVS Pharmacy, 
Inc., 2 (Jan. 15, 2009), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement 
/examples/cvsresagrcap.pdf. 
127 See Resolution Agreement: CVS Pays $2.25 Million & Toughens Disposal Practices 
to Settle HIPAA Privacy Case, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs 
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/cvsresolutionagreement.html (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2012). 
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(WPM) without a valid authorization to enable WPM to market 
Medicare Advantage plans to those individuals.128 
Some covered health plan and health care provider disclosures 
were due to theft. In 2009, for example, covered health plan Blue 
Cross Blue Shield of Tennessee (BCBST) discovered a theft of 
computer equipment, including 57 hard drives believed to contain 
over one million health plan member names, identification numbers, 
diagnosis codes, dates of birth, and social security numbers.129 The 
data stolen also included over 300,000 video recordings and over one 
million audio recordings containing patient identifiable 
information.130 BCBST internal investigation confirmed that the PHI 
of 1,023,209 individuals was stored on the hard drives.131 Also in 
2009, an Alaska Department of Health and Social Services computer 
technician had a portable electronic device potentially containing 
ePHI stolen from his vehicle.132 
Some inappropriate disclosures by covered health plans and health 
care providers were caused by the behavior of just one covered entity 
employee. In 2009, for example, a Massachusetts General Hospital 
(MGH) employee removed from MGH premises documents 
containing PHI so that the employee could work from home.133 The 
PHI consisted of billing encounter forms containing the name, date of 
birth, medical record number, health insurer and policy number, 
diagnosis and name of provider of 66 patients and the practice’s daily 
office schedules for three days containing the names and medical 
	
128 See Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Management 
Services Organization Washington, Inc., 1 (Dec. 13, 2010), available at http://www.hhs 
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/msoresultionagreement.pdf. 
129 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and BlueCross 
BlueShield of Tennessee, 1–2 (Mar. 9, 2012), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy 
/hipaa/enforcement/examples/resolution_agreement_and_cap.pd. 
130 Id. at 1. 
131 Id. at 2. 
132 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and Alaska 
Department of Health and Social Services, 1 (June 25, 2012), available at http://www.hhs 
.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/alaska-agreement.pdf. 
133 Written Resolution Agreement and Corrective Action Plan between the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Office for Civil Rights, and The General 
Hospital Corporation and Massachusetts General Physicians Organization, Inc., 1 (Feb. 14, 
2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/examples/mass 
generalracap.pdf [hereinafter MGH Resolution Agreement]. 
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record numbers of 192 patients134 of MGH’s Infectious Disease 
Associates outpatient practice, including patients with HIV/AIDS.135  
Three days later, when the employee was commuting back to work on 
the subway, the employee removed the records containing PHI from 
her bag and placed them on the seat beside her.136 Upon exiting the 
subway, the MGH employee left the documents on the subway train 
and they were never recovered. 
As of July 31, 2012, OCR had investigated and resolved 17,025 
cases of Privacy Rule violations by requiring changes in privacy 
practices and other corrective actions by covered health plans and 
health care providers.137 The most common types of covered entities 
that were required to take corrective action to achieve voluntary 
compliance were, in order of frequency: private medical practices, 
general hospitals, outpatient facilities, health plans (including group 
health plans and health insurance issuers), and pharmacies.138 
In summary, Congress’s initial decision in 1996 to directly regulate 
health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care 
providers was well justified. Before and after the compliance date for 
the Privacy Rule, thousands of health industry participants had 
inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of patients and 
insureds.139 
Even though thousands of health industry participants 
inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of patients and 
insureds, the question is whether there is any evidence that outside 
health care counsel also were (or are) inappropriately using or 
disclosing PHI received from their health industry clients. Because 
HHS did not directly regulate outside health care counsel and other 
BAs prior to HITECH, HHS would not be the source of such 
information, at least such information dating prior to HITECH. After 
HITECH, when Congress gave HHS the statutory authority to directly 
	
134 Id. 
135 Resolution Agreement: Massachusetts General Hospital Settles Potential HIPAA 
Violations, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy 
/hipaa/enforcement/examples/massgeneralra.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
136 MGH Resolution Agreement, supra note 133, at 1. 
137 See Enforcement Highlights (as of July 31, 2012), U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/enforcement/highlights/07312012 
.html (follow “Enforcement Results as of the Date of This Summary” hyperlink) (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2013). 
138 Id. 
139 See supra text accompanying notes 116 to 138. 
TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  8:39 AM 
2013] Gone Too Far: Federal Regulation of Health Care Attorneys 841 
regulate BAs140 and gave state attorneys general the statutory 
authority to take action against covered entities and BAs in their 
states who inappropriately used and disclosed PHI,141 research 
revealed only one action against a BA. However, that BA was not an 
attorney. On July 31, 2012, Minnesota Attorney General Lori 
Swanson (AG) announced that business associate Accretive Health, 
Inc., a Chicago-based debt collector that managed the revenue 
operations of several Minnesota hospitals, was being forced to cease 
operations in the State of Minnesota under a settlement of the AG’s 
federal lawsuit against Accretive.142 One of the reasons for the AG’s 
lawsuit was the discovery that an Accretive laptop containing data on 
over 23,000 patients of two Minnesota covered hospitals was stolen 
from the rental car of an Accretive employee.143 Accretive’s failure to 
maintain the confidentiality of its client hospitals’ PHI does not 
suggest that attorneys as a class are unable to maintain client 
confidentiality. 
Another source of information regarding the inappropriate use or 
disclosure of PHI by BAs might be states that, through state health 
information confidentiality laws that are similar to the federal Privacy 
Rule, apply directly to BAs. Since its enactment in 2001, for example, 
the Texas Medical Records Privacy Act (Texas Act) has always 
directly regulated Covered Entities, BAs, and any other person who 
comes into possession of, obtains, or stores PHI.144 That is, the Texas 
	
140 See HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The 
additional requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable 
with respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”). 
The date by which BAs must comply with their new obligations under the Final 
Modifications is September 23, 2013. Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,566. 
Therefore, HHS has not yet taken action against a BA for its failure to comply with the 
Final Modifications. 
141 See HITECH § 13410(e) (“[I]n any case in which the attorney general of a State has 
reason to believe than an interest of one or more of the residents of that State has been or is 
threatened or adversely affected by any person who violates a provision of this part, the 
attorney general of the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action on behalf of such 
residents of the State in a district court of the United States of appropriate jurisdiction        
. . . .”). 
142 Attorney General Swanson Says Accretive Will Cease Operations in the State of 
Minnesota Under Settlement of Federal Lawsuit, OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GEN. LORI 
SWANSON (July 31, 2012), http://www.ag.state.mn.us/Consumer/PressRelease/07312012 
AccretiveCeaseOperations.asp. 
143 Id. 
144 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(A)–(D) (West, Westlaw 
through 2011 Sess.); see also Bednar, supra note 107, at 906 (explaining that “[t]he result 
of [the Texas Act’s overbroad language] is that countless persons with no direct 
relationship to health care are statutorily liable for safeguarding PHI in Texas”). 
TOVINO (DO NOT DELETE) 4/4/2013  8:39 AM 
842 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91, 813 
Act has always directly regulated outside health care counsel who 
receive medical records, billing records, and other records containing 
PHI from their health industry clients. Enforcement of the Texas Act 
includes injunctive relief,145 civil penalties,146 investigation and 
disciplinary actions,147 and attorney general action.148 Effective 
September 1, 2012, the Texas Legislature the civil penalties that may 
be imposed on BAs and other individuals who violate the Texas Act; 
that is, civil penalties may be assessed up to: (1) $5,000 per violation 
that is committed negligently; (2) $25,000 per violation that is 
committed knowingly or intentionally; (3) $250,000 per violation that 
is committed intentionally and if PHI is used for financial gain; and 
(4) $1.5 million if a “pattern or practice” is found.149 As of this 
writing, research revealed no injunctions, civil penalties, investigative 
or disciplinary actions, or attorney general actions taken against any 
Texas-licensed attorneys (or any other BAs, for that matter) for their 
failure to maintain the confidentiality of PHI received from their 
covered entity clients in accordance with the Texas Act. 
Another source of information regarding the possible inappropriate 
use or disclosure of PHI by outside health care counsel would be 
cases in which state-licensed health-care attorneys had been accused 
by a state agency of violating state rules of professional conduct that 
require attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client 
communications, as described in Part IV of this Article. Research 
revealed only two published opinions in cases in which a state agency 
accused an attorney of failing to maintain the confidentiality of PHI 
received from a client. 
In In re Harman, Wisconsin-licensed attorney Donald Harman was 
accused by the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility (Board) of a number of rule violations, including 
mishandling client funds, representing a client in the presence of a 
conflict of interest without obtaining a written consent of the conflict, 
knowingly disobeying an obligation of tribunal rules, using 
information obtained during the representation of a former client to 
that former client’s disadvantage, and revealing information relating 
	
145 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.201(a). 
146 Id. § 181.201(b). 
147 Id. § 181.202. 
148 Id. § 181.201(e). 
149 Id. § 181.201(b)(1)–(3), (c). 
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to the representation of the client without the client’s consent.150 With 
respect to the final allegation, Harman was consulted by a client about 
a potential legal malpractice action against another attorney who had 
formerly represented the client in a medical malpractice action.151 In 
connection with the potential legal malpractice representation, 
Harman obtained the former attorney’s files, including the client’s 
medical records, which contained information about the client’s drug 
and alcohol dependence and history of self-abusive behavior.152 
Without the client’s consent, Harman disclosed the client’s drug and 
alcohol dependence and history of self-abusive behavior to a 
Wisconsin county district attorney who was prosecuting the client’s 
former boyfriend for domestic abuse of the client.153 
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that Harman violated Rule 
1.6(a) of the Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys 
when he disclosed the client’s drug and alcohol dependence and 
history of self-abusive behavior to the district attorney.154 The court 
explained: “[I]t is a ‘fundamental principle’ in the client-lawyer 
relationship that the lawyer maintain confidentiality of ‘information 
relating to the representation.’”155 The court further explained: “[T]he 
rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client, ‘. . . but also to all 
information relating to the representation whatever its source.’”156  
The court upheld the board’s recommendation that Harman’s license 
to practice law be suspended for six months.157 
Far from suggesting that outside health care counsel as a class 
routinely make inappropriate uses or disclosures of PHI, the Harman 
case suggests that one general practice attorney who had a lengthy 
history of professional conduct problems (this was Harman’s fourth 
disciplinary action) may need more stringent sanctions imposed on 
him by his state bar. The case also illustrates, however, a weakness 
associated with the use of the post-HITECH Privacy Rule as a 
mandate for attorney confidentiality. The post-HITECH Privacy Rule 
	
150 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Wis. 
2001). 
151 Id. at 358. 
152 Id. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 361. 
155 Id. at 361. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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only protects a patient’s PHI when it is in the hands of an attorney 
who represents a covered entity, such as a health care provider or 
health plan. When an attorney represents a patient or insured, the 
post-HITECH Privacy Rule does not regulate the attorney’s use or 
disclosure of the PHI because the patient or insured does not fall 
within the definition of a covered entity. This Article argues that a 
patient’s or insured’s health information should not have fewer 
confidentiality protections simply because the attorney who maintains 
the information is directly representing the patient or insured instead 
of the patient’s or insured’s health care provider or health plan. State 
rules of professional conduct, by contrast, appropriately require 
adherence to rules of confidentiality by all attorneys, including 
attorneys who represent health care providers and health plans as well 
as attorneys who represent patients and insureds. 
In addition to In re Harman, research revealed only one other 
published opinion in which a state agency accused an attorney of 
failing to maintain the confidentiality of PHI received from a client. 
In In re Mullins, Indiana-licensed attorney Patty Sue Mullins was 
accused by the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission of 
violating Rule 1.6 of the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct for 
Attorneys at Law (Indiana Rule 1.6), which prohibits lawyers from 
revealing confidential client information.158 As background, the 
parents of an Indiana woman who was in a persistent vegetative state 
had petitioned an Indiana court for authority to compel the woman’s 
health care providers to withdraw the woman’s artificially-
administered hydration and nutrition based on the parents’ belief that 
the daughter would never recover from her brain injury.159 Mullins, 
who disagreed with the parents’ plan, created an Indiana corporation 
named the Christian Fellowship with the Disabled, Inc. (Fellowship) 
and filed on behalf of the Fellowship a petition that would appoint 
Mullins as temporary guardian of the woman based on Mullins’s 
belief that the woman was being medically neglected due to her lack 
of hydration and nutrition.160 After a court appointed Mullins as 
temporary guardian, Mullins faxed portions of the woman’s medical 
records to several news media outlets throughout Marion County, 
Indiana, apparently in an attempt to justify Mullins’s involvement in 
the litigation.161 
	
158 In re Mullins, 649 N.E.2d 1024, 1025 (Ind. 1995). 
159 Id. at 1025. 
160 Id. 
161 Id. 
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The Supreme Court of Indiana held that Mullins violated Indiana 
Rule 1.6, reasoning that “no legitimate or recognized justification for 
[Mullins’s] county-wide dissemination of the records” existed.162 The 
Court further explained that the woman’s medical record was 
“information relating to representation of a client” within Indiana 
Rule 1.6 and that “[a] lawyer must make every effort practicable to 
avoid unnecessary disclosure of information relating to a 
representation, [and] to limit disclosure to those having a need to 
know it.”163 In light of Mullins’s lack of prior disciplinary actions, 
her devotion of significant time and energy during her legal career to 
public causes, and her lack financial or other sinister motives, the 
court ordered only public reprimand and admonishment.164 
The Mullins case is a second example of a general practice 
attorney, not a health care attorney, who inappropriately disclosed a 
client’s PHI. Like Harman, the Mullins case also illustrates a 
weakness associated with the use of the post-HITECH Privacy Rule 
as a mandate for attorney confidentiality. Again, the post-HITECH 
Privacy Rule would not have regulated Mullins because Mullins was 
representing a patient, not a covered entity. And, again, this Article 
argues that a patient’s health information should not have fewer 
confidentiality protections simply because the attorney who maintains 
that information is directly representing the patient instead of the 
patient’s health care provider. State rules of professional conduct, 
including the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at 
Law, appropriately require adherence to rules of confidentiality by all 
attorneys, including attorneys who represent health care providers as 
well as attorneys who represent patients. 
In addition to the two published opinions in Harman and Mullins, 
research also revealed one unpublished opinion in which a state 
agency accused an attorney of failing to maintain the confidentiality 
of PHI received from a client. In Statewide Grievance Committee v. 
Paige, the Connecticut Statewide Grievance Committee (Committee) 
accused Connecticut-licensed attorney Sheri Paige of violating eight 
different Connecticut Rules of Professional Conduct, including Rule 
1.6 relating to the confidentiality of client information, in connection 
with the representation of a client with respect to his application for 
	
162 Id. at 1025. 
163 Id. at 1026. 
164 Id. 
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immigration to the United States.165 In particular, when Paige 
provided the individual with a list of information that would assist 
Paige in processing the immigration application, the list was 
handwritten on the reverse side of a piece of paper that contained 
medical information relating to another client of Paige’s.166 The 
medical information included the name of the client’s treating 
physician and the details of the physician’s medical bill.167 The 
Superior Court of Connecticut held that “[b]y allowing access to this 
confidential information, [Paige] violated Rule 1.6(a).”168 Given 
Paige’s significant prior disciplinary history, the number of rule 
violations associated with the instant representation, and the lack of 
any mitigating factors, the court suspended Paige from the practice of 
law for a period of one year.169 As in Harman and Mullins, the 
Statewide Grievance Committee case would not have implicated the 
post-HITECH Privacy Rule because Paige inappropriately disclosed 
the PHI of a client who was a patient, not a covered entity. 
Another source of information regarding the possible inappropriate 
use or disclosure of PHI by outside health care counsel would be 
cases in which private plaintiffs accused their health care providers or 
health plans’ outside health care counsel of inappropriately using or 
disclosing PHI. Research revealed only one relevant case. In Biddle v. 
Warren General Hospital, several patients brought a class action 
against a hospital and its outside law firm, alleging that the hospital 
inappropriately disclosed PHI to the law firm to enable the law firm to 
search for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility for the 
payment of patients’ unpaid medical bills.170 In addition to holding 
that an independent tort exists for the unauthorized, unprivileged 
disclosure of confidential information by the hospital to the law 
firm,171 the Supreme Court of Ohio also held that the law firm could 
be held independently liable for inducing the hospital’s unauthorized 
and tortious disclosure of information to the firm.172 The court 
reasoned that the attorney’s need for the information (including the 
	
165 Statewide Grievance Comm. v. Paige, No. CV030198335S, 2004 WL 1833462, at 
*2–3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 14, 2004). 
166 Id. at *2. 
167 Id. at *7. 
168 Id. at *7. 
169 Id. at *9. 
170 Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 518 (Ohio 1999). 
171 Id. at 523. 
172 Id. at 528. 
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attorney’s desire to benefit the patients by making them eligible for 
SSI) was irrelevant unless the need also advanced or protected some 
interest giving rise to a privilege.173 The court further reasoned that 
the only interest that had been recognized in such regard was the 
patient’s interest in obtaining medical care and treatment, and that 
disclosure would be limited to those who have a legitimate interest in 
the patient’s health.174 In the end, the court held that the law firm 
could be held liable for inducing the hospital’s unauthorized, 
unprivileged disclosure of nonpublic medical information learned 
within the context of the physician-patient relationship.175 
Unlike the attorneys in Harman, Paige, and Statewide Grievance 
Committee, the law firm in Biddle was using and disclosing the PHI 
of a covered entity; that is, a hospital. The law firm in Biddle thus 
would have been regulated by the Privacy Rule had the facts in Biddle 
not occurred in the mid-1990s, almost a decade before the 2003 
compliance date for the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule and fifteen years 
prior to HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule directly to BAs. 
However, even if the case had occurred later in time, the Privacy Rule 
would have allowed the hospital and law firm to use and disclose the 
patients’ PHI without their prior authorization in order to determine 
SSI eligibility; that is, the Privacy Rule expressly permits covered 
entities and their BAs to use and disclose PHI for certain “payment” 
activities and the definition of “payment” includes determinations of 
insurance eligibility and coverage.176 In summary, Ohio tort law, not 
the Privacy Rule, would have prohibited the hospital and law firm’s 
activities. 
Other than Harman, Paige, Statewide Grievance Committee, and 
Biddle, research revealed no other cases in which a state-licensed 
attorney was accused by a state agency in an administrative action or 
a client in a private tort action of inappropriately using or disclosing 
PHI received from the client. This Article assumes that our careful 
research missed a few cases that did not contain standard search terms 
such as “attorney!,” “lawyer!,” “counsel!,” “law firm!,” “law 
practice,” “medical record!”, “health record!,” “health information,” 
“confidential!,” “privacy,” “private,” and “Rule 1.6,” but that did 
	
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1) (2011) (“A covered entity may use or disclose protected 
health information for its own treatment, payment, or health care operations.”); id. § 
164.501 (defining “payment” to include “[d]eterminations of eligibility or coverage”). 
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involve an allegation by a state agency or a private plaintiff against an 
attorney or law firm for the failure to maintain the confidentiality of 
PHI. Even assuming a 500 percent error rate in our research, research 
would reveal twenty or fewer judicial opinions involving cases in 
which outside counsel failed to maintain the confidentiality of PHI. 
Twenty cases of inappropriate uses and disclosures of PHI by outside 
counsel probably do not justify Congress and HHS’s decision to 
extend the Privacy Rule when compared to the thousands of covered 
entities who inappropriately used and disclosed the PHI of millions of 
patients and insureds. 
Assuming for the moment that Congress and HHS had sufficient 
justification for extending the Privacy Rule directly to attorneys who 
constitute BAs, note that in three of the four cases described above 
the Privacy Rule would not have regulated (or deterred) the conduct 
described because the defendant attorneys in those cases failed to 
maintain the PHI of clients who were patients, not covered entities. In 
the fourth case, Biddle, the Privacy Rule would now regulate the 
defendant law firm’s use and disclosure of the PHI it received from its 
covered hospital client; however, the Privacy Rule explicitly 
authorizes the use and disclosure of PHI for the SSI eligibility 
purposes described in Biddle. In summary, the extension of the 
Privacy Rule directly to attorneys who meet the definition of a BA 
would not have made any difference to the outcomes of the four 
identified cases in which an attorney allegedly inappropriately used 
and disclosed PHI. 
Compared to state rules of professional conduct described in Part 
IV, the Privacy Rule thus has several weaknesses. First, the Privacy 
Rule only regulates attorneys who represent covered entities, whereas 
state rules of professional conduct appropriately regulate all attorneys 
with respect to their use and disclosure of confidential client 
information. Second, the Privacy Rule allows some information uses 
and disclosures disallowed by state rules of professional conduct and 
complained of by patients like the plaintiffs in Biddle. 
B. HITECH’s Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care 
Counsel Is Illogical and Unnecessary 
As discussed in Part III, HITECH makes BAs adhere to the same 
Privacy Rule use and disclosure requirements that apply to covered 
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entities.177 The problem is that the Privacy Rule’s use and disclosure 
requirements were designed for health industry participants and are 
illogical when applied to attorneys.178 For example, the Privacy Rule 
allows Covered Entities to freely use and disclose PHI for their own 
treatment, payment, and related health care operations activities.179 
Health care providers use PHI to treat their patients, health plans use 
PHI to determine whether and how much to pay for such treatments, 
and both health care providers and health plans engage in dozens of 
related health care operations activities, so this particular use and 
disclosure allowance makes a great deal of sense in the health care 
setting. Attorneys do not treat patients or request payment for treating 
patients, (and to do so would constitute the unlicensed and criminal 
practice of medicine180 as well as state and federal health care fraud 
and abuse181) so the regulatory allowance for treatment and payment 
activities usually does not make sense in the legal setting. In fact, 
other than “legal services,” which is included in the fourth paragraph 
of the six-paragraph definition of “health care operations,”182 
attorneys do not engage in, or perform on behalf of their covered 
entity clients, most of the other activities that are regulated by the 
standards, requirements, and implementation specifications set forth 
in the Privacy Rule. These activities include, but are not limited to, 
patient referrals, patient consultations, health care utilization review, 
medical necessity reviews, risk adjustments based on a current or 
prospective insured’s health status and demographic characteristics, 
training of health care professionals, health care quality assessment 
and improvement, development of clinical guidelines, health care 
protocol development, case management and care coordination, 
	
177 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The additional 
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable with 
respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”); 
Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (adding 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a)(3)) (stating 
that a BA is not permitted to use or disclose PHI in a manner that would violate the 
requirements of the Privacy Rule if done by a covered entity). 
178 See infra text accompanying notes 179–89. 
179 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1). 
180 See, e.g., TEX. OCC. CODE ANN. § 155.001 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.) (prohibiting an individual from practicing medicine without a license to practice 
medicine); id. § 165.151(a) (making the unlicensed practice of medicine a criminal offense 
in the State of Texas). 
181 See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006) (codifying the federal False Claims Act 
prohibition of the submission of health care claims by individuals not licensed to provide 
health care). 
182 45 C.F.R. § 164.501. 
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health care professional peer review, medical training of health care 
professionals, health insurance underwriting, health insurance 
premium rating, public health activities, biomedical and behavioral 
research.183 In summary, other than generally prohibiting attorneys 
from inappropriately using or disclosing PHI, which state rules of 
professional conduct already prohibit,184 the provisions in the Final 
Modifications185 are nonsensical when applied to attorneys. 
On the other hand, ABA Model Rule 1.6 (and analogous provisions 
within state rules of professional conduct) was designed expressly for 
attorneys. Each provision within a state rule of professional conduct 
makes sense when applied to an attorney with respect to the 
attorney’s use or disclosure of confidential client information. 
Typically, the main confidentiality provision requires all licensed 
attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client information 
acquired during the course of, or by reason of representation of, a 
client, applies regardless of whether the client is a covered entity or 
not.186 Typically, the main provision applies not only to matters 
communicated to the attorney in confidence by the client but also to 
all information relating to the representation, whatever its source, and 
regardless of whether the information was obtained from a covered 
entity or a non-covered entity.187 All medical records, billing records, 
and other information and data obtained by an attorney while 
representing a covered entity or non-covered entity thus constitutes 
“confidential information” for purposes of rules of professional 
responsibility.188 In addition, the ABA Model Rules and most state 
	
183 Id. §§ 164.501–164.514 (regulating a variety of health care related uses and 
disclosures of PHI). 
184 See supra Part IV (summarizing the confidentiality obligations of attorneys under 
state rules of professional conduct). 
185 See Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695 (adding new 45 C.F.R. § 
164.500(c), stating: “Where provided, the standards, requirements, and implementation 
specifications adopted under this subpart apply to a business associate with respect to the 
protected health information of a covered entity.”). 
186 See, e.g., TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a) (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 amendments). 
187 See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 361 
(Wis. 2001). 
188 See, e.g., id. (discussing a disciplinary action taken by then-named Wisconsin Board 
of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (Board) against a Wisconsin-licensed attorney for 
his failure to maintain the confidentiality of his client’s medical records; the Board 
suspended the attorney’s license to practice law for six months after finding, among other 
things, that the client “did not authorize [the attorney] to release her medical records to 
anyone. [The attorney’s] disclosure of information that he obtained while representing [the 
client] violated client-lawyer confidentiality”; the Wisconsin Supreme Court further 
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rules of professional conduct list situations in which an attorney may 
disclose otherwise confidential client information.189  Unlike the 
Privacy Rule’s exceptions for uses and disclosures of PHI for 
treatment, payment, health care operations, and public policy 
activities which, for the most part, are illogical when applied to 
attorneys, the permissions set forth in state rules of professional 
conduct make sense when applied to attorneys. 
The extension of the Privacy Rule directly to outside counsel is 
illogical for other reasons. For example, it is not clear that HHS has 
the knowledge, skill, expertise, or resources to regulate attorneys. 
Through its ten health-related operating divisions, including the 
Administration for Children and Families, the Administration for 
Community Living, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, the Food and Drug Administration, 
the Health Resources and Services Administration, the Indian Health 
Service, the National Institutes of Health, and the Substance Abuse 
and Mental Health Services Administration,190 HHS’s stated mission 
is to protect the health of all Americans and to provide essential 
human services, especially for those who are least able to help 
themselves.191 HHS’s expertise, by its own admission, is in the 
	
explained that, “[T]he rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies not only to matters 
communicated in confidence by the client, ‘ . . . but also to all information relating to the 
representation whatever its source.’”). 
189 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b) (2011) (“A lawyer may 
reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer 
reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily 
harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain 
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in 
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer’s services; (3) to prevent, 
mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is 
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client’s commission of a crime or 
fraud in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer’s services; (4) to secure legal 
advice about the lawyer’s compliance with these Rules; (5) to establish a claim or defense 
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a 
defense to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which 
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the 
lawyer’s representation of the client; (6) to comply with other law or a court order; or (7) 
to detect and resolve conflicts of interest arising from the lawyer’s change of employment 
or from changes in the composition or ownership of a firm, but only if the revealed 
information would not compromise the attorney-client privilege or otherwise prejudice the 
client.”). 
190 HHS Leadership: Operating Divisions, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
http://www.hhs.gov/open/contacts/index.html#od (last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
191 About HHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/about/ 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2013). 
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provision of health and human services to individuals who need 
health care and social services,192 not in the provision of legal advice 
to clients with legal problems or in the regulation or discipline of 
attorneys. 
Unlike HHS, each state bar has special expertise in the practice of 
law, the requirements for the professional and ethical practice of law, 
and the regulation of attorneys in that state.193 Indeed, one of the 
stated missions of most state bars is to assure that the public is 
protected and served by attorneys and other legal services providers 
who meet the highest standards of competence and ethics, including 
standards relating to client confidentiality.194 All state bars are 
governed by a board of directors, governors, or trustees, the majority 
of the members of which usually are attorneys who are also licensed 
to practice law in that state and thus are familiar with the ethical and 
legal requirements to which attorneys must adhere, including 
requirements relating to client confidentiality.195 All state bars have a 
discipline system that is designed to protect the public, the courts, and 
the profession from attorneys who violate ethical rules covering their 
professional conduct.196 Given the extremely small number of cases 
in which state-licensed attorneys have been accused by their clients or 
state bars of the inappropriate use and disclosure of PHI,197 this 
Article suggests that: (1) state bars are appropriately educating 
attorneys regarding the importance of client confidentiality; (2) the 
sanctions that state bars may impose on non-compliant attorneys, 
	
192 Id. (“The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is the United States 
government’s principal agency for protecting the health of all Americans and providing 
essential human services, especially for those who are least able to help themselves.”). 
193 See, e.g., The State Bar of California Overview, STATE BAR OF CAL., http://www 
.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs/StateBarOverview.aspx (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) [hereinafter 
State Bar of California]. 
194 See, e.g., id. (describing the mission of the State Bar of California); Our Mission at 
the State Bar of Texas, STATE BAR OF TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template 
.cfm?Section=Our_Mission&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=19576 (last 
visited Jan. 28, 2013) (outlining the mission of “foster[ing] high standards of ethical 
conduct for lawyers, enabl[ing] its members to better serve their clients and the public”); 
Our Mission, STATE BAR OF NEV., http://www.nvbar.org/content/our-mission (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2013) (“Our Mission is to govern the legal profession, to serve our members, and 
to protect the public interest. Our Goals are . . . to uphold and elevate the standard of 
honor, integrity, and courtesy in the legal profession . . . .”). 
195 See, e.g., State Bar of California, supra note 193 (describing governance in the state 
bar in relevant section of page). 
196 See, e.g., id. (describing the state’s attorney discipline system in relevant section of 
page). 
197 See supra text accompanying notes 140–57. 
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including fines, license suspension, and license revocation, are 
serving as appropriate deterrents against breaches of confidentiality 
involving PHI; and/or (3) attorneys learned in law school, through 
required coursework in Professional Responsibility classes, the 
importance of client confidentiality and have applied that learning to 
protect client records that include PHI. 
In summary, HITECH’s extension of Privacy Rule principles to 
outside health care counsel is somewhat illogical and unnecessary 
given: (1) the lack of evidence that attorneys inappropriately use or 
disclose their covered entities’ PHI; (2) the fact that most of the 
Privacy Rule is illogical when applied to attorneys; (3) the fact that 
the only Privacy Rule provisions that make sense when applied to 
attorneys are the general provisions that prohibit BAs from using or 
disclosing PHI for non-permitted purposes;198 (4) the fact that state 
rules of professional conduct already prohibit attorneys from using or 
disclosing PHI for non-legal and other inappropriate or non-permitted 
purposes; and (5) the fact that HHS has stated expertise in the 
provision of health and human services, not in the practice of law, the 
regulation of attorneys, or the discipline of attorneys. 
C. HITECH’S Extension of the Privacy Rule to Outside Health Care 
Counsel Will Exacerbate Existing Conflicts of Interest 
HITECH’s extension of the Privacy Rule to outside health care 
counsel also will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest. As 
background, an attorney generally is prohibited from representing a 
client if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of 
interest.199 Under the ABA’s Model Rules, a concurrent conflict of 
interest exists when either: (1) the attorney’s representation of one 
client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another client, a 
former client, or a third person, or by a personal interest of the 
lawyer.200 
	
198 See 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(i) (requiring BAAs to “[e]stablish the permitted and 
required uses and disclosures of such information by the business associate” and 
prohibiting the BAA from authorizing the BA to further use or disclose the PHI in a 
manner that would violate the Privacy Rule if done by the covered entity); Final 
Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,696 (adding new 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a), stating: “A . . . 
business associate may not use or disclose protected health information, except as 
permitted or required by [the Privacy Rule or the Breach Notification Rule]”). 
199 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2011). 
200 Id. 
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Although the Privacy Rule and HITECH do not pit one covered 
entity against another in a way that would implicate the first 
provision, there is a risk that an outside health care counsel’s 
representation of a covered entity, when the outside counsel is 
required to enter into a BAA with that same covered entity, would be 
materially limited by the personal interests of the outside counsel. 
That is, in drafting the BAA between the covered entity and itself, the 
outside counsel would have an interest in minimizing its obligations 
under the BAA whereas the covered entity would desire provisions, 
such as indemnification provisions and limitation of liability 
provisions, that would protect the covered entity in the case of the 
outside counsel’s own breach of confidentiality involving the covered 
entity’s PHI.201 
In addition, under the pre-HITECH Privacy Rule, the outside 
counsel was required to agree through the BAA to report to the 
covered entity any inappropriate uses or disclosures of the covered 
entity’s PHI of which the BA became aware, including the outside 
counsel’s own inappropriate uses and disclosures.202 Because the 
BAA was required to authorize the covered entity to terminate the 
BAA (and therefore the underlying representation agreement) if the 
covered entity determined that the BA violated a material term of the 
agreement,203 and because the outside counsel’s reporting of its own 
inappropriate uses and disclosures to the covered entity could result in 
the covered entity’s termination of the BAA (and therefore the 
underlying representation agreement), the outside counsel had a 
personal interest in not reporting any confidentiality violations to the 
covered entity. 
HITECH exacerbates these conflicts of interest due to its creation 
of four new breach notification requirements. First, HITECH requires 
covered entities to notify each individual whose uPHI has been, or is 
reasonably believed by the covered entity to have been, accessed, 
acquired, or disclosed as a result of a breach.204 Second, HITECH 
requires covered entities to notify prominent media outlets serving a 
	
201 See, e.g., Alan Stuart Goldberg, HIPAA, HITECH Act, Attorneys, and Business 
Associates: Professional Conduct Contracting Requirements Are Expanding–Are You 
Ready Now? VA. STATE BAR, 3, 5 (Mar. 29, 2010), http://www.vsb.org/docs/sections 
/health/hipaahitech2010130929032010.pdf (discussing the potential conflicts of interest 
that exist when an attorney represents a covered entity and enters into a BAA with that 
covered entity, and the specific conflicts associated with indemnification provisions). 
202 45 C.F.R. § 164.504(e)(2)(iii). 
203 Id. 
204 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13402(a), 123 Stat. 115, 260 (2009). 
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state or jurisdiction following the discovery of a breach of uPHI 
involving more than 500 residents of such State or jurisdiction.205 
Third, HITECH requires covered entities to: (1) immediately notify 
the Secretary of HHS following the discovery of a breach of uPHI 
involving 500 or more individuals; and (2) create and maintain a log 
of breaches involving less than 500 individuals and annually submit 
such log to the Secretary.206 Fourth, HITECH imposes additional 
breach notification requirements directly on BAs. That is, HITECH 
requires a BA who discovers a breach of uPHI to notify the covered 
entity of the breach without unreasonable delay and in no case later 
than sixty calendar days after the discovery of a breach.207 
If outside counsel (or one of counsel’s employees, agents, or 
subcontractors) is the source of a confidentiality breach, counsel 
would have an incentive not to notify its appropriate covered entity 
client of such breach, in accordance with the fourth breach 
notification requirements above, because counsel would risk: (1) the 
covered entity’s termination of the BAA (and, thus, the underlying 
representation agreement),208 which would result in a loss to counsel 
of the covered entity’s legal business; (2) the covered entity’s 
reporting of the breach to the individuals who are the subject of the 
information,209 which could lead to private lawsuits against counsel 
based on the disclosure tort, as in the Biddle case;210 (3) the covered 
entity’s reporting of the breach to prominent media outlets,211 which 
could be damaging to counsel’s business and personal reputation; and 
(4) the covered entity’s reporting of the breach to the Secretary,212 
which could trigger an audit and lead to the imposition of civil and 
criminal penalties directly against counsel.213 In summary, HITECH’s 
breach notification requirements create additional risks that counsel’s 
representation of the covered entity would be limited by counsel’s 
own interest in not reporting confidentiality breaches in order to avoid 
the loss of legal business, future tort lawsuits, damage to counsel’s 
	
205 Id. § 13402(e)(2). 
206 Id. § 13402(e)(3). 
207 Id. § 13402(b); Final Modifications, supra note 24, at 5,695 (adopting 45 C.F.R. § 
164.410(b)). 
208 See supra text accompanying note 203. 
209 See supra text accompanying note 204. 
210 See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518 (Ohio 1999); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 170–75. 
211 See supra text accompanying note 205. 
212 See supra text accompanying note 206. 
213 See supra Part III.C. 
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reputation, government audits, and government-imposed civil and 
criminal penalties. 
It is also possible that outside counsel will discover a Privacy Rule 
violation by the covered entity. Although the breach notification rules 
do not require BAs to report covered entity violations to the 
individuals who are the subject of the information, the media, or HHS 
(so conflicts are not created due to any such mandatory notification 
obligations), outside counsel certainly would want to avoid 
complicity with the violation, especially because violations can give 
rise to civil and criminal penalties for both covered entities and BAs. 
Counsel who know of a Privacy Rule violation by a client covered 
entity will thus face several ethical and professional questions, 
including whether to represent the covered entity in any civil or 
criminal action by the federal government or whether to withdraw 
from representation due to a conflict, such as outright complicity or a 
more subtle desire to minimize evidence of counsel’s own 
contributions to the Privacy Rule violation and to provide evidence to 
the government suggesting that the covered entity had greater fault. 
Finally, as discussed in Part III.C, HITECH section 13411 provides 
that BAs shall be subject to periodic audits by the Secretary of HHS 
as one way of ensuring that BAs are complying with their new, direct, 
privacy-related requirements.214 The new statutory allowance for 
auditing of BAs may be problematic from the perspective of the 
covered entity because there is some precedent stating that production 
of law firm records in response to government audits may waive both 
the attorney-client privilege as well as work-product doctrine 
protection.215 
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest, 
an attorney may start or may continue to represent a client under the 
Model Rules, but only if four criteria are satisfied: First, the attorney 
must reasonably believe that he or she will be able to provide 
“competent and diligent representation” to the covered entity; second, 
the representation must not be “prohibited by law”; third, the 
representation must not involve the “assertion of a claim by one client 
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation 
or other proceeding before a tribunal”; finally, each affected client 
must give “informed consent, confirmed in writing.”216 
	
214 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13411, 123 Stat. 115, 276 (2009). 
215 CHRISTIANSEN ET AL., supra note 51, at 20. 
216 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2011). 
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Although the second and third criteria should be non-issues in this 
context, the first and fourth criteria do require further consideration. 
The outside counsel must reasonably believe that he or she will be 
able to provide competent and diligent representation to the covered 
entity and the covered entity must give written, informed consent to 
the conflict of interest. That is, the outside counsel must recognize: 
(1) the incentives he or she will have to not include language in the 
BAA that is favorable to the covered entity (and unfavorable to the 
BA), such as indemnification or limitation of liability provisions; (2) 
that he or she will have an incentive not to report its own 
confidentiality lapses and breaches to the covered entity; (3) that in an 
investigation by HHS into a breach that possibly involved both the 
covered entity and the outside counsel, that counsel would have an 
incentive to minimize its own contributions and blame the violation 
on the covered entity; and (4) that any audit of itself by HHS could 
result in waiver of both the attorney-client privilege as well as work-
product doctrine production. Given these recognitions, counsel would 
have to make a determination that he or she would still be able to 
provide competent and diligent representation to the covered entity. In 
addition, counsel would need to disclose all of these potential 
conflicts to the covered entity in writing and obtain the covered 
entity’s consent to such conflicts. In summary, HITECH exacerbates 
existing conflicts of interest between outside health care counsel and 
covered entities. 
VI 
A LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY PROPOSAL 
In light of the argument that HITECH’s extension of the Privacy 
Rule’s confidentiality requirements directly to outside health care 
counsel who meet the definition of a BA is unjustified, illogical, and 
unnecessary, and will exacerbate existing conflicts of interest between 
outside health care counsel and their clients, the final question is 
whether HITECH’s imposition of direct confidentiality duties on BAs 
should be challenged, retained, or disposed of. It is unlikely that a 
challenge by an individual attorney, group of attorneys, or law-related 
professional association, such as the ABA, with respect to HITECH’s 
extension of the Privacy Rule to attorneys would be successful. In 
American Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission, the ABA 
and the New York State Bar Association (NYSBA) challenged the 
direct application of the confidentiality-related requirements within 
the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) to attorneys, reasoning 
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that the GLBA did not give the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
jurisdiction to regulate state-licensed attorneys.217 As background, 
effective in 1999, the GLBA imposed comprehensive confidentiality 
obligations on financial institutions with respect to their clients’ 
nonpublic personal information.218 
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit agreed 
with the ABA and NYSBA and held that state-licensed attorneys 
engaged in the practice of law were not “financial institutions” within 
the GLBA’s provisions that required protection of consumer financial 
information.219 The court reasoned: 
The states have regulated the practice of law throughout the history 
of the country; the federal government has not. This is not to 
conclude that the federal government could not do so. We simply 
conclude that it is not reasonable for an agency [the FTC] to decide 
that Congress has chosen such a course of action in [GLBA 
statutory] language that is, even charitably viewed, at most 
ambiguous.220 
It is unlikely that a challenge similar to the challenge in American 
Bar Association v. Federal Trade Commission would be effective 
with respect to HITECH. Unlike the statutory provisions within the 
GLBA, which did not extend authority to the FTC to regulate 
attorneys as financial institutions, the statutory provisions within 
HITECH specifically require the direct regulation of BAs.221 
In a later lawsuit, the ABA challenged the FTC’s application of the 
federal Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions (FACT) Act to 
attorneys.222 As background, the FACT Act amended the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act to authorize the FTC to promulgate regulations 
requiring financial institutions and creditors to establish internal 
procedures to prevent identity theft.223 In 2007, the FTC adopted 
identity theft rules (Red Flags Rules) that required such “financial 
institutions and creditors to implement and maintain programs to 
protect consumers from identity theft.”224 Neither the FACT Act nor 
	
217 See Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 430 F.3d 457, 458 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
218 Id. at 459. 
219 Id. at 470–71. 
220 Id. at 472. 
221 HITECH, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13404(a), 123 Stat. 115, 264 (2009) (“The additional 
requirements of this subtitle that relate to privacy and that are made applicable with 
respect to covered entities shall also be applicable to such a business associate . . . .”). 
222 Am. Bar Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 636 F.3d 641, 643 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
223 Id. 
224 Id. 
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the Red Flag Rules specified whether the Red Flags Rules applied to 
attorneys.225 In 2009, in response to public confusion regarding the 
application of the Red Flags Rules, “the FTC issued an Extended 
Enforcement Policy, explaining that ‘professionals, such as lawyers or 
health care providers, who bill their clients after services are 
rendered,’ would be considered ‘creditors’ under the [FACT Act] and 
therefore, subject to the [Red Flags] Rule’s requirements.”226 Shortly 
thereafter, the ABA sued, challenging the FTC’s Extended 
Enforcement Policy on the grounds that the FTC had intruded upon 
the practice of law, an area of traditional state regulation.227 Due to 
the enactment of subsequent legislation addressing the precise issue 
before the court in favor of the ABA, the court ultimately dismissed 
the case as moot.228 
In summary, there is precedent for a legal challenge to the direct 
regulation of state-licensed attorneys by federal agencies; however, 
such legal challenges were supported by a lack of statutory authority 
for the extension of federal requirements to attorneys. In the instant 
case, HITECH specifically states Congress’ desire to directly regulate 
BAs.229 
The next question is whether the confidentiality duties imposed by 
HITECH on BAs who are attorneys should be retained together with 
the confidentiality duties imposed on attorneys under State Rules of 
Professional Conduct (with the Privacy Rule’s preemption provisions 
governing differences between the two sets of authorities). HHS knew 
when it drafted the Privacy Rule that other confidentiality schemes 
existed under state law and that the Privacy Rule would need to be 
reconciled with such other confidentiality schemes to the extent such 
authorities conflicted.230 To that end, HHS included within the 
Privacy Rule a provision specifying that, in general, the Privacy Rule 
	
225 Id. 
226 Id.; see also FTC Extended Enforcement Policy: Identity Theft Red Flags Rule, 16 
C.F.R. § 681.1, 1 n.2 (2008) (“For example, creditors under the ECOA [Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act] include professionals, such as lawyers or health care providers, who bill 
their clients after services are rendered.”). 
227 Am. Bar Ass’n, 636 F.3d at 643. 
228 Id. at 649. 
229 See supra text accompanying note 221. 
230 See How Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Reduce the Potential for Conflict with State 
Laws?, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/faq 
/preemption_of_state_law/401.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
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preempts contrary state laws.231 A state law will survive preemption, 
however, if the state law relates to the privacy of individually 
identifiable health information and is more stringent than the relevant 
Privacy Rule provision.232 Among other examples, a state law would 
be more stringent than a Privacy Rule provision if: (1) with respect to 
a use or disclosure, the state law prohibits or restricts a use or 
disclosure in circumstances under which such use or disclosure 
otherwise would be permitted under the Privacy Rule; or (2) the state 
law provides greater privacy protection for the individual who is the 
subject of the PHI.233 
One of the reasons for the Privacy Rule’s preemption provisions 
was to establish a new federal “floor” for the confidentiality of health 
information.234 Prior to the Privacy Rule, Congress and HHS found 
that a patchwork of state law existed; that is, some states had no or 
very few health information confidentiality protections while other 
states had robust health information confidentiality protections.235 
Because the patchwork of state health information confidentiality 
laws failed to provide a consistent and comprehensive legal 
foundation relating to health information confidentiality, Congress 
and HHS desired a national health information confidentiality policy 
with consistent rules.236 
	
231 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2011) (“A standard, requirement, or implementation 
specification adopted under this subchapter that is contrary to a provision of State law 
preempts the provision of State law.”). 
232 Id. § 160.203(b). 
233 Id. § 160.202 (defining “more stringent”). 
234 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,464 (“The rule sets a floor of 
ground rules for health care providers, health plans, and health care clearinghouses to 
follow, in order to protect patients and encourage them to seek needed care. The rule seeks 
to balance the needs of the individual with the needs of the society. It creates a framework 
of protection that can be strengthened by both the federal government and by states as 
health information systems continue to evolve.”). 
235 Id. at 82,466 (“States have, to varying degrees, attempted to enhance confidentiality 
by establishing laws governing at least some aspects of medical record privacy. This 
approach, though a step in the right direction, is inadequate. These laws fail to provide a 
consistent or comprehensive legal foundation of health information privacy. For example, 
there is considerable variation among the states in the type of information protected and 
the scope of the protections provided.”). 
236 Id. at 82,466 (“Neither private action nor state laws provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive and rigorous legal structure to allay public concerns, protect the right to 
privacy, and correct the market failures caused by the absence of privacy protections . . . 
Hence, a national policy with consistent rules is necessary to encourage the increased and 
proper use of electronic information while also protecting the very real needs of patients to 
safeguard their privacy.”). 
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Unlike the topic of health information confidentiality, which prior 
to the 2003 compliance date for the Privacy Rule did not have a 
consistent or comprehensive national legal foundation, the topic of 
attorney-client confidentiality had its start over a century ago. In 
1908, the ABA’s House of Delegates adopted the ABA Canons of 
Professional Ethics, including a canon relating to client 
confidentiality.237 In 1969 and 1983, the ABA House of Delegates 
adopted its first Model Code of Professional Responsibility and 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, respectively.238 Both the 
Model Code and the Model Rules contained rules relating to client 
confidentiality.239 Michigan adopted the Model Rules in 1988, and 
West Virginia, California, and Hawaii followed suit in 1989, 1992, 
and 1994, respectively.240 As of today, fifty jurisdictions, including 
the District of Columbia, have adopted the Model Rules.241 California 
is the only state that does not have professional conduct rules that 
follow the format of the ABA Model Rules.242 
In summary, one of the reasons for the Privacy Rule’s preemption 
provisions was to establish a new federal “floor” for the 
confidentiality of health information due to the nonexistence, 
insufficiency, and/or inconsistency of state law on the topic. In 
contrast, the ABA through its Model Rules in 1983 (and earlier 
through its Canons of Professional Ethics in 1908 and its Model Code 
of Professional Responsibility in 1969) had already established a 
national, consistent set of rules relating to attorney ethics, including 
client confidentiality, that nearly every jurisdiction has adopted. 
Below, this Article proposes that Congress amend HITECH to give 
HHS the authority to except certain classes of BAs, including outside 
counsel, from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. This proposal has 
	
237 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: About the Model Rules, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules 
_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
238 Id. 
239 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (as amended 1983). 
240 See Chronological List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/chrono_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
241 See Alphabetical List of States Adopting Model Rules, ABA, http://www.american 
bar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_con
duct/alpha_list_state_adopting_model_rules.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
242 See Model Rules of Professional Conduct: State Adoption of Model Rules, ABA, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules 
_of_professional_conduct.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2013). 
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its foundation in HHS’s decision to except other classes of 
individuals, institutions, and information from regulation by the 
Privacy Rule when there exists a national, sufficient, and consistent 
set of relevant rules. In 2002, for example, HHS exempted from 
regulation under the Privacy Rule academic institutions that 
maintained education records that also contain PHI due to the 
national, sufficient, and consistent confidentiality protections already 
in place under the federal Family Education Rights and Privacy Act 
of 1974 (FERPA).243  HHS reasoned that Congress specifically 
addressed how academic institutions should protect the confidentiality 
of education records, including education records that contain PHI, 
under FERPA and that Congress probably did not intend to amend or 
preempt FERPA when it enacted HIPAA.244 HHS further reasoned 
that it would be unduly burdensome for health care providers 
employed by academic institutions to have to comply with two 
different, yet similar, sets of regulations under FERPA and 
HIPAA.245 
Similarly, the ABA already specifically addressed how attorneys 
should maintain the confidentiality of all information relating to a 
client’s representation and that states have responded by enacting 
their own state rules of professional conduct, almost all of which 
follow the same format as the ABA’s Model Rules. Further, it would 
be unduly burdensome for attorneys who represent covered entities to 
have to comply with two different sets of rules; that is, their own state 
rules of professional conduct and the Privacy Rule, especially when 
the Privacy Rule is illogical when applied to attorneys. 
Instead of challenging or retaining HHS’s ability to regulate BAs, 
Congress should amend HITECH to give HHS the authority to except 
certain classes of BAs, including outside health care counsel, from 
direct regulation by the Privacy Rule. There is precedent in other 
federal health laws for such an exception. When initially enacted in 
1989, for example, the federal Stark Law246 directly regulated 
physicians who referred Medicare and Medicaid patients to clinical 
	
243 Final HIPAA Privacy Rule, supra note 13, at 82,483 (“We have excluded education 
records covered by FERPA . . . from the definition of protected health information. . . . We 
followed this course because Congress specifically addressed how information in 
education records should be protected in FERPA. . . . We do not believe Congress 
intended to amend or preempt FERPA when it enacted HIPAA.”). 
244 Id. 
245 Id. 
246 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2006). 
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laboratories with which the physicians had a financial relationship.247 
Effective in 1995, amendments to the Stark Law expanded the law’s 
application to physicians who referred Medicare and Medicaid 
patients to entities with which they had a financial relationship for a 
number of additional designated health services (DHS). In addition to 
clinical laboratory services, DHS now includes physical therapy, 
occupational therapy, and outpatient speech-language pathology 
services; radiology and certain other imaging services; radiation 
therapy services and supplies; durable medical equipment and 
supplies; parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies; 
prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies; home 
health services; outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and 
outpatient hospital services.248 Given the extremely broad statutory 
list of DHS for which physicians are prohibited from referring 
Medicare and Medicaid patients if a financial relationship exists, 
Congress in the Stark Law gave HHS the authority to except certain 
relationships from the general referral prohibition.249 HHS responded 
by establishing through regulations certain exceptions so that the 
referral prohibition set forth in the Stark Law was not overly broad 
and did not prohibit relationships that would not give rise to health 
care fraud and abuse.250 
Similarly, Congress should amend HITECH section 13404, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 17934, by adding certain language at the end 
of subsections (a) and (c). The proposed language would recognize 
that some classes of BAs: (1) do not have a history, or pattern or 
practice, of inappropriately using or disclosing their covered entity 
clients’ PHI; (2) are already regulated under other law, such as state 
law, with respect to their uses and disclosures of their covered entity 
clients’ PHI; and (3) already risk civil, criminal, and/or administrative 
penalties by agencies with more experience and expertise than HHS 
in regulating such BAs. The proposed additions to subsection (a) 
would give HHS the authority to except qualifying classes of BAs 
from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule and the proposed additions 
to subsection (c) would except the same qualifying classes of BAs 
from the additional imposition of civil and criminal penalties by the 
	
247 AM. MED. ASS’N, THE STARK LAW RULES OF THE ROAD 2.1 (2011). 
248 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(h)(6). 
249 See id. § 1395nn(b)(4) (giving HHS the authority to adopt “other permissible 
exceptions” if the Secretary determines that the excepted relationships do not pose a risk 
of Medicare or Medicaid Program or patient abuse). 
250 See 42 C.F.R. §§ 411.350–411.389 (2011). 
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federal government under the HIPAA statute. The proposed language 
is italicized and placed at the end of each subsection within 42 U.S.C. 
§ 17934, as follows: 
(a) Application of contract requirements. In the case of a business 
associate of a covered entity that obtains or creates protected health 
information pursuant to a written contract (or other written 
arrangement) described in section 164.502(e)(2) of title 45, Code of 
Federal Regulations, with such covered entity, the business 
associate may use and disclose such protected health information 
only if such use or disclosure, respectively, is in compliance with 
each applicable requirement of section 164.504(e) of such title. The 
additional requirements of this subchapter that relate to privacy and 
that are made applicable with respect to covered entities shall also 
be applicable to such a business associate and shall be incorporated 
into the business associate agreement between the business 
associate and the covered entity. The Secretary of the Department of 
Health and Human Services shall have the authority to except 
certain classes of business associates from the direct application of 
this subchapter.  The Secretary’s authority to grant such exceptions 
shall be based on evidence showing that the excepted classes: (i) do 
not have a historical pattern or practice of inappropriately using or 
disclosing protected health information; (ii) are restricted in using 
and disclosing protected health information by state or other 
applicable law; and (iii) are already subject to civil, criminal, 
and/or administrative penalties for the inappropriate use or 
disclosure of confidential information by a state or other 
administrative agency with experience and expertise in regulating 
the excepted class. 
(c) Application of civil and criminal penalties.  In the case of a 
business associate that violates any provision of subsection (a) or 
(b), the provisions of sections 1176 and 1177 of the Social Security 
Act (42 U.S.C. 1320d–5, 1320d–6) shall apply to the business 
associate with respect to such violation in the same manner as such 
provisions apply to a person who violates a provision of part C of 
title XI of such Act [42 U.S.C. 1320d et seq.].  If the Secretary of 
the Department of Health and Human services excepts a class of 
business associates from the direct application of this subchapter 
under subsection (a) of this section, that class of business associates 
shall also be excepted from the imposition of civil and criminal 
penalties under this subsection.251 
HHS should further amend the Privacy Rule to establish a process 
through which HHS can implement such exceptions and identify 
excepted classes of BAs. Specifically, HHS should add the following 
italicized language to the Privacy Rule at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(d) 
establishing the criteria to be used in making exception decisions, as 
	
251 42 U.S.C. §§ 17934(a), (c) (2011). 
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well as at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e) in order to clarify that state-licensed 
attorneys have been granted an exception: 
(d) Where provided, and unless the class to which the business 
associate belongs has been excepted by the Secretary from direct 
regulation by this subchapter under subsection (d) of this section, 
the standards, requirements, and implementation specifications 
adopted under this subpart apply to a business associate with respect 
to the protected health information of a covered entity. 
(e) The following classes of business associates shall be excepted 
from direct regulation by this subchapter based on evidence 
showing that the excepted classes do not have a historical pattern 
or practice of inappropriately using or disclosing protected health 
information, are already restricted in using and disclosing 
protected health information by state or other applicable law, and 
are already subject to civil, criminal, and/or administrative 
penalties for the inappropriate use or disclosure of PHI by a state 
or other administrative agency with experience and expertise in 
regulating the excepted class: (1) state-licensed attorneys who are 
required to maintain the confidentiality of client communications 
and records under state rules of professional conduct and who are 
subject to disciplinary action by their State Bars for their failure to 
maintain the confidentiality of client communications; (2) False 
Note that the Secretary may build on the proposed language set forth 
in 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e) over time, by adding additional sub-
sections at 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(e)(2), (3), (4), etc., to identify 
additional excepted classes of BAs. 
Finally, state bars should consider strengthening the sanctions that 
may be imposed on licensed attorneys who fail to maintain the 
confidentiality of client communications and records that contain 
PHI. In In re Harman, remember, the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
upheld the Wisconsin Board of Attorneys Professional 
Responsibility’s (Board’s) decision to impose a six-month suspension 
of Wisconsin-licensed attorney Harman’s license to practice law 
based on a number of professional failures, including Harman’s 
mishandling of client funds, his representation of a client in the 
presence of a conflict of interest without obtaining a written consent 
of the conflict, his knowing disobeyance of an obligation of tribunal 
rules, his use of information obtained during the representation of a 
former client to that former client’s disadvantage, and his revelation 
of information relating to the representation of the client without the 
client’s consent.252 With respect to the last allegation, the Supreme 
	
252 See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 628 N.W.2d 351, 354 (Wis. 
2001). 
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Court of Wisconsin held that Harman violated Rule 1.6(a) of the 
Wisconsin Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys when he 
disclosed the client’s PHI, including information stating that the client 
had a history of drug and alcohol dependence and a history of self-
abusive behavior. State agencies such as the Board should be 
authorized to impose more stringent sanctions when the client 
communications or records that were inappropriately used or 
disclosed by the attorney contain PHI. Specifically, the ABA should 
consider adding a new comment (following the existing nineteen 
comments that interpret) Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules,253 as follows: 
Protected Health Information 
[20] When using or disclosing client information that contains 
protected health information, as defined by federal regulation at 45 
C.F.R. § 160.103, the lawyer shall recognize the sensitivity of such 
information. The inappropriate use or disclosure of client 
information containing protected health information may be 
considered as an aggravating factor in imposing disciplinary action 
upon the lawyer. 
CONCLUSION 
Outside health care counsel frequently obtain medical records, 
billing records, health insurance claims records, and other records 
containing individually identifiable health information in the course 
of representing health industry clients in medical malpractice, 
licensure, certification, accreditation, fraud and abuse, peer review, 
and other civil, criminal, and administrative health law matters. This 
Article is the first to argue that state rules of professional conduct, not 
federal health information confidentiality regulations, should govern 
outside health care counsel’s use and disclosure of confidential client 
information. 
This Article’s proposal—that Congress give HHS the authority to 
except certain classes of BAs, including outside health care counsel, 
from direct regulation by the Privacy Rule—is based on several 
research findings, including the lack of a historical pattern or practice 
on the part of attorneys in inappropriately using or disclosing PHI, the 
lack of fit between the health care-related requirements of the Privacy 
Rule and the legal reasons for which attorneys use and disclose PHI, 
the presence and effectiveness of state rules of professional conduct 
that already require attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of client 
	
253 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmts. (2011). 
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information, the availability of disciplinary action for attorneys who 
fail to maintain confidentiality, and the experience and expertise of 
State Bars (and the lack of experience and expertise on HHS’s part) in 
regulating and disciplining attorneys. 
Going forward, Congress and HHS should more carefully consider 
the broad application of health care-related regulations to non-health 
industry participants. Congress and HHS’s desire to protect the 
confidentiality of PHI from inappropriate uses and disclosures by 
BAs is laudable. However, the direct regulation of outside health care 
counsel by the Privacy Rule causes duplication of regulation and 
disciplinary authority and exacerbates existing conflicts of interest 
between counsel and their covered entity clients. 
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